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Aging populations,  high unemployment,  and changes in eco-
nomic  structure  may  require  fundamental  reform  of both benefit
formulas  and approaches  to the financing  of retirement  systems.
One thing is clear using high-cost,  long-term  retirement  sys-
tems  to mitigate  short-  and medium-term  unemployment  prob-
lems is a costly, inefficient  solution to the problems  faced by
economies  in transition.
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In multiple-pillar  retirement  systems,  the govern-  market to provide  this security,  and how these
ment provision  of old-age  income  support  plays  cbjectives  can be attained  given available
a very different  role from vehicles for encourag-  financing  mechanisms.
ing private retirement  savings  - and for the
government  regulation  and insurance  of private  She finds  evidence  that many  retirement
savings.  systems  will be forced  to change  a great deal in
the next few decades.  In some cases:
Despite  the diversity  of public and private
retirement  systems,  and despite  their wealth  and  * Retirement  benefits  will have to be reduced
their  potential  impact  on labor and capital  (perhaps  by imposing  a means  test).
markeis,  they are often  overlooked  in structural
analyses  of country  problems  and prospects.  * The age for early retirement  wil have to be
raised.
Mitchell  examines  important  institutional
features  cf retirement  systems  in industrial  and  * Multiple-pillar  plans will  have to be inte-
develoP'i.g  countries  and outlines what is known  grated and streamlined  to rationalize  work
about  their economic  effects. She also identifies  incentives.
ways in which public and private retirement
systems  affect economic  adjustment,  paying  * Incentives  and opportunities  for private
special attention  to the costs and benefits  of  saving will  be increased.
encouraging  early retirement.
In any case,  using high-cost,  long-term
She finds that a coherent  plan for retirement  retirement  systems  to mitigate  short-  and me-
referu must identify  how much  old-age  income  dium-term  unemployment  problems  will prob-
security  is affordable,  how the govenmment  and  ably  prove costly and inefficient  as a solution  to
private sector  can address  failures  in the private  problems  faced  by economies  in transition.
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Table  5 ...  21There  are more  persons  over  age 65 living  today  than  at any  previous  moment  in the
world's  history,  and  their  numbers  are  growing.  Among  the industrialized  nations  that are  members  of
the Organisation  for Economic  Cooperation  and Development  (OECD),  there  is  one person  65  years  of
age or older  for each  five  persons  age 15  to 64,  and the  dependency  ratio  will  increase  rapidly  over  the
next  few  decades. 1 Despite  longer  life  expectancies  and no evidence  of deterioration  in health  profiles
among  most  older  workers,  early  retirement  is becoming  Increasingly  common.  The  cost  of supporting
retirees  Is  climbing:  public  retirement  systems  amount  to about  10  percent  of national  income,  and  make
up 20 percent  of total govemment  expenditure  Wlt  most developed  nations  (see  Table  1). As the new
century  dawns,  it seems  clear  that public  retirement  systems  along  with  their  private-sector  counterparts
will be Increasingly  called  on to support  the world's  aging  population.
Although  public  and private  sector  retirement  systems  command  a great  deal  of wealth
and  have  potentially  powerful  effects  on  labor  and  capital  markets,  they  are  often  overlooked  in  structural
analyses  of country  problems  and prospects.  This  paper  examines  important  institutional  features  of
retirement  systems  in the developed  world  as well  as in several  developing  nations,  and outlines  what
Is known  about  their  economic  effects.  Also  identified  are  ways  in which  public  and private  retirement
systems  affect  the process  of economic  adjustment,  with  a special  focus  on the costs  and benefits  of
encouraging  early  retirement  for older  workers  affected  by structural  adjustment.
Retirement  systems  dier across  nations.  Sometimes  a publicly-provided  old-age  pension
is  the  primary  component  of retirement  security,  while  in  other  countries,  individual,  company,  and  family
sources  comprise  older  generations'  main  source  of support.  Institutional  rules  regarding  benefit  levels,
and the manner  In which  these benefits  are financed,  differ  tremendously  across  countries. These
structural  dierences imply  that  the  economic  effects  of retirement  systems  vary  greatly  from  one  country
to another.2
Table 1
Public Pension Expenditure as a Percent of GDP In OECD Natiorn
1960  1975  1980  1985
Australia  3.3  4.5  4.9  4.90
Austria  9.6  12.5  13.5  14.5
Belgium  N/A  10.5  11.9  N/A
Canada  2.8  3.7  4.4  5.4
Denmark  4.6  7.8  9.1  8.5
Finland  3.8  6.1  6.5  7.10
France  6.0  10.1  11.5  12.7
Germany  9.7  12.6  12.1  11.8
Greece  N/A  4.8  5.8  10.7
Iceland  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Ireland  2.5  4.2  4.5  5.4
Italy  5.5  10.4  12.0  15.6
Japan  1.3  2.6  4.4  5.3
Luxembourg  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
NetheTlands  4.0  8.9  11.0  10.5
New Zealand  4.3  5.3  7.6  8.1
Norway  3.1  8.0  7.9  8.00
Portugal  N/A  4.1  6.1  7.2
Spaln  N/A  4.3  7.3  8.6'
Sweden  4.4  7.7  10.9  11.2
Switzerland  2.3  7.7  8.0  8.1
Turkey  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Unied Kingdom  4.0  6.0  6.3  6.7
United States  4.1  6.7  6.9  7.2
OECD  averageb  4.3  7.1  8.2  8.9
Notes:
N/A: data  not  available.
'Ratio  of annual  public  expenditure  on pensions  to current-year  GDP. Public  pensions  include  both  transfers
through  social  programs  and pension  payments  to retired  govemment  employees.  Privately  sponsored  pensions
are not  Included,  nor are  tax expenditures  granted  to private  and/or  public  plan  savings.
bOECD  average  represents  the  unweighted  mean  of available  figures.
'Figures  are  for 1984.
Source:
OECD  (1090),  Table  7, p. 33,  and  author's  calculations.  Figures  for Germany  refer  to the former  nation  of  West
Germany.3
Despite these differences,  the retirement  systems  of most developed  nations,  and
increasingly  developing  economies  as well,  contront  a number  of common  problems.  In the years  to
come,  most  nations  will  experience  population  aging,  hlgig  unemployment  rates,  and  shifts  in economic
structure.  These  pose  new  challenges  for retirement  systems,  and may  require  fundamental  reforms  In
both  benefit  formulas  and financing  approaches.  An understanding  of how  existing  retirement  systems
work,  or sometimes  fail  to work,  offers  valuable  lessons  for the  future. No  country  would  wish  to simply
import  another  nation's  model  In toto. Nevertheless,  i Is  useful  to Identify  successful  experiences  to be
emulated,  and  unsuccessful  experiments  to be  avoided.  Better  understanding  of what  makes  for efficient
and  equiable  retirement  systems  that  can  meet  the  changing  demographic  and  economic  needs  of  future
generatons  of workers  and retirees  will be Invaluable  for both developed  nations  and economies  In
transkion.
The  plan  of the paper  is as  follows. Section  A briefly  reviews  recent  trends  toward  early
retrement,  and  evaluate  explanations  for  these  trends.  Institutional  characteristics  of retirement  systems
are  discussed  in Section  B,  which  Introduces  the notion  of  wmultiple-pillarsWfor  retirement  income  securiy
Including  govemment,  employer,  and Individual/family  support.  Of central  interest  are  pension  coverage
and benefit  pattems,  as well  as funding  and investment  practices.  Section  C presents  a discussion  of
the economic  effects  of retirement  systems  on labor  and  capital  markets.  Conclusions,  policy  options,
and research  needs  for policymakem  offering  economic  assistance  to economies  in transkion  are
enumerated  in the final  section.
A. Retirement  Patterns  and Flows
This  section  presents  data  on  recent  trends  toward  early  retirement,  and  evaluates  several
explanations  for  these  trends. One  of  the most  Important  change  in  industrialized  nations'  labor  markets
over  the  last  two  decades  was  a massive  movement  to eariy  retirement.  There  Is  support  for the  view  that
the trend toward earlier  retirement  was fac!itated  and strongly  motivated  by factors  which made  i
poss:ble  for  older  workers  to leave  their  main  jobs,  Including  public  and  private  pensions,  as  well  as other4
income  support programs. This long downward  trend In lifetime  work comes despite  longer  life
expectancies  in  many  developed  nations,  and  without  any  evidence  of system-wide  deterioration  in  health.
How retirement  systems  have  contributed  to this long-term  downward  trend In work  at older  ages Is
ex_-nilned  in the next  Section.
Trends  to Earlier  Retirement
Defining  what  constitutes  "retirement"  differs  not  only  from  nation  to nation,  but  from  one
person  to the next. In many  developed  nations,  a transition  to retirement  is taken  to mean  the point
where  one accepts  a public  pension;  this may or may  not co.ncide  with labor  force withdrawal. In
Sweden  for example,  many  retirees  are  partially  employed  after  acceoting  a public  pension,  while  In  the
Unltea  States  pension  acceptance  and work cessation  are virtually  synonymous  (Fields  and Mitchell
1984b). In other countries,  accepting  a privately-provided  retirement  payment,  rather  than a public
pension,  constitutes  retirement;  in Japan,  for instance,  many  workers  retire  from their  ca  er job with  a
lump  sum  pension,  and often  move  to some  other,  usually  lower  paying  employment,  for several  years
(Rebick  1993).
Yet  a different  view  of what  constitutes  retirement  is  gamered  by  surveys  of older  persons
who self-report"  their retirement  status  using  any definition  they wish;  usually  such surveys  produce
higher  rates  of retirement  than  objectively  defined  measures  which  equates  retirement  with  complete  labor
force  withdrawal.  Additionally,  retirement  is not  an absorbing  state  in many  nations,  in  that many  older
persons  move  fluidly  between  full and part-time  wage  jobs, self  employment,  unemployment,  leisure
activities,  and perhaps  in some  countries  work  In  the "grey or "underground"  economy. 2
These  different  definitons  of retirement  are more than semantic,  since altemative
measures  produce  very  distinct  estimates  of the size  of the country's  actual  and potential  labor  force.
In general,  labor  economists  prefer  to define  retirement  using  an objective  labor force participation
measure,  in lieu of a self-reported  definition  or one which  relies  on pension  acceptance.  Even  here,
however,  there  are cross-country  differences  in the definition  of labor  force  participants  making  these5
so-called  more  objective  measures  less  than  fully  comparable  across  nations.  Thus  In  the former  West
Germany,  older persons  became  eligible  for a special  unemployment  benefit  after being  jobless  for a
specffied  time;  on  accepting  this  special  benefit,  they  were  removed  from  the  official  unemployment  count,
and were  thereafter  excluded  from  the labor  force  count  (KohIl  and others  1991).  Elsewhere,  as In  the
United  States,  older  workers  are  not privy  to a special  unemployment  subsidy  and are  thus more  likely
to be included  In :abor force  statistics  as long  as they  seek  work.
Which  specffic  retirement  concept  Is used  Is  also important  for policy  reasons,  and the
concepts  of most  interest  may  depend  on  which  policy  concern  is preeminent.  Analysts  concerned  with
a pension  plan's  funding  status  will  tend  to focus  on the  age of pension  acceptance  for the purpose  of
predicting  benefit  outflows.  In contrast,  labor  force  measures  (e.g.  labor  force  participation  or hours  of
work)  may be more  useful  in determining  whether  tax collections  will be sufficient  to meet pension
financing  needs. Analysts  focusing  on alleviation  of poverty  in old age  will  wish  to know  not only  older
persons'  labor  force  status  in  the wage  labor  market,  but might  also  wish  to examine  whether  income  is
generated  by self-employment,  and the employment  and eamings  status  of other  family  members.
While  no  single  retirement  concept  is  appropriate  for all policy  matters,  the  best  data  for
the countries  of central  interest  to this  study  are  labor  force  participation  rates  for older  persons.  Hence
a brief  examination  of  these  Is  useful,  with  the  caveat  that  cross-country  comparisons  may  be  somewhat
Inaccurate,  as compared  to within-country  time  series  labor  force  participation  pattems.
Retirement  Trends  in the  OECD: Labor  force  participation  rates  of older  individuals  are
by no means  uniform  across  the developed  countries  (see  Table  2). For example,  only  4 percent  of the
men  age 65  and older  were  in the labor  force  in 1985  in the Netherlands,  while  in Japan  as many  as 37
percent  participated.  Similar  cross-national  dffferences  are  observed  for men  age  55-64,  with  rates  of 19
percent  In Austria,  and 76 percent  in Sweden.
Despite  persistent  long-run  differences  In levels  of labor force participation  across
countries,  there  has  been  a common  downward  trend  in men's  participation  in  developed  nations  since
World  War  II. This  persistent  long-run  labor  market  trend  was  widespread  across  developed  nations6
Table 2
Labor Force Participation Rates (%) of Older Workers In OECD Countrieh
Men  Women
Country  Year  Aae 55.64  Age 65+  Age 55464  Aae 65 +
Australia
1970  85.1  22.1  23.3  3.7
1975  78.8  16.7  23.7  3.9
1980  88.a  11.1  22.0  2.9
1985  60.4  8.9  19.3  2.0
1990  83.3  8.5  25.0  2.3
Austria*
1970  47.2  9.7  14.9  3.4
1975  36.8  7.0  13.0  2.8
1980  34.5  4.4  14.5  3.0
1985  19.1  3.7  8.7  1.6
1990  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Canada
1970  84.2  22.6  29.8  5.0
1975  79.4  18.5  30.8  5.0
1980  76.2  14.7  33.7  3.3
1985  70.2  12.3  33.8  4.2
1990  64.9  11.4  35.7  3.9
Finland
1970  71.1  19.0  46.3  4.4
1975  62.3  10.3  44.4  2.8
1980  57.3  17.0  43.0  6.0
1985  57.8  10.6  46.2  4.8
1990  45.4  7.9  39.7  2.9
France
1970  75.4  19.5  40.0  8.6
1975  68.9  13.9  35.9  5.8
1980  68.5  7.5  39.7  3.3
1985  50.1  5.3  31.0  2.2
1990  45.8  3.7  31.3  1.5
Germany
1970  82.2  19.9  29.9  6.5
1975  68.1  10.8  24.8  4.5
1980  65.5  7.0  27.2  3.1
1985  57.5  5.2  23.9  2.5
1990  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Ireland
1970  91.0  44.0  21.3  11.3
1975  83.8  28.2  20.9  7.2
1980  79.1  23.7  19.5  4.8
1985  77.7  19.0  18.3  3.6
1990  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Italy*
1970  48.2  12.9  10.6  2.6
1975  42.4  10.4  8.5  2.1
1980  39.6  12.6  11.0  3.5
1985  38.2  8.9  10.5  2.1
1990  35.9  8.0  10.1  2.27
Men  Women
Country  Year  Age 5564  Ace5+  Age 55-64  Aae 65 +
Japan
1970  86.6  49.4  44.4  17.9
1975  86.0  44.4  43.7  15.3
1980  85.4  41.0  45.3  15.5
1985  83.0  37.0  45.3  15.5
1990  83.3  36.5  47.2  16.2
Netherlands
1970  80.8  11.4  14.9  2.3
1975  73.0  8.0  14.3  1.8
1980  63.6  4.8  14.3  0.9
1985  56.5  4.2  15.8  1.0
1990  45.7  N/A  16.7  N/A
Norway**
1970  N/A  58.7  N/A  24.9
1975  N/A  55.6  N/A  23.0
1980  N/A  53.3  N/A  24.7
1985  N/A  44.3  N/A  25.2
1990  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Portugal
1970  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
1975  78.3  36.3  32.3  11.1
1980  75.0  27.8  32.0  8.6
1385  68.6  23.0  33.2  8.2
1990  66.9  20.0  32.5  7.8
Spain
1970  84.2  25.9  22.0  7.7
1975  79.8  18.8  23.0  6.3
1980  75.7  12.3  21.2  3.8
1985  66.3  5.9  20.0  2.1
1990  62.4  3.8  19.5  1.7
Sweden
1970  85.4  28.9  44.5  8.7
1975  82.0  19.9  49.1  6.1
1 )80  78.7  14.2  55.3  3.7
1985  76.0  11.0  59.9  3.2
1990  75.4  12.3  66.3  5.1
Un!teld  Kingdom
1970  91.3  20.2  39.3  6.4
1975  87.8  15.8  40.3  4.9
1980  81.8  10.5  39.2  3.6
1985  66.4  7.6  34.1  3.2
1990  68.1  8.6  38.9  3.3
United States
1970  80.7  25.7  42.2  9.0
1975  74.6  20.7  40.7  7.8
1980  71.2  18.3  41.0  7.6
1985  67.3  15.2  41.7  6.8
1990  67.1  15.8  45.0  8.1
notes:
N/A: data not available
*Age group is 60.64 lbr Italy and Austria
**Age group Is 60 and over for Norway8
through  the mid  1980s  and  Is  one  of  the most  striking  labor  market  developm  nts  In  the last  halt-century.
These  trends  translate  directly  into  earlier  retirement  ages:  for instance,  in  the  United  States,  twenty  years
ago men  retired  at age  65 on average,  and now  the  average  retirement  age is 62 (Ippolito  1986).
The  general  downward  trend  in market  participation  which  characterized  older  men  was
also  seen  among  older  women  across  the  OECD  countries,  but in  a muted  form. Participation  rate  trends
of older  women  are  more  difficult  to summarize  because  many  women  entered  the  paid  labor  market  only
relatively  recently,  and  have  not  accumulated  enough  years  of service  to retire  with  a pension  plan  in  their
50's.  Hence  institutional  factors  no  doubt  provide  an Incentive  for women  to remain  on the  job at older
ages,  which  offsets  the general  trend  to earlier  retirement  predominant  for males. As Is evident  from
Table  2, women's  market  participation  rates  among  those  over  age  65 have  remained  quite  low across
the OECD  nations,  and the slow change  among  those  aged  55-64  reflects  both  positive  and negative
Influences  on retirement  pattems.
As a whole,  the data  show  that fewer  and fewer  older  persons  ari. working  for pay in
developed  nations.  This  trend  is particularly  striking  in view  of the fact  that life  expectancies  In most of
these  countries  have  been  rising  in the last  fifty  years,  and health  problems  for people  in their  50s  and
60s  are,  at the very  worst,  no more  serious  than  they  were  fifty  years  ago (Baily  1987).  Earlier  retirement
is therefore  increasingly  the norm,  despite  the  fact  that people  are  now living  longer  in the retirement
period. 3
Retirement  Trends  in Transition  Economies:  Tracking  retirement  trends  is more  difficult
in the transition  economies,  which here are taken  to mean Eastem  Europe  and the former  Soviet
Republics.  These  countries  share  some  retirement  system  problems  with  those  nations  in Asia,  Latin
America  and  Africa  conventionally  Included  in  the  developing  country  group. Time  series  are  less  readily
available,  surveys  tend  to be less  comparable,  and  the meaning  of labor  force  participation  rates  is less
clear  when  large  segments  of the population  are  engaged  in subsistence  farming  and related  activities.
Also  older  workers'  health  pattems  tend  to be worse  in the developing  nations. For example  a recent
survey  of older  workers'  health  status  in Hungary  pointed  out  that  life  expectancies  have  actually  declined9
over  the last  several  decades  in that country,  and the incidence  of occupational  illness  Is  far higher.'
Because  of these  caveats,  about  the most  that  can  be said  is that  there  is a great  deal
of cross-country  variation  in participation  rates  for older workers  In transkion  economles,  as can be
determined  by  an examination  of the data  from  Table  3. Labor  force  participation  rates  of older  persons
tend  to be  higher  here  than  the  average  for developed  nations:  for instance,  in Poland  33  percent  of the
men  age  65+ were  In the labor  force  at the end of the 1980s,  as compared  to rates  below  10  percent
in France  and Italy. A notable  outlier  is Hungary  where  only 3-4  percent  of men  and women  age 65+
are  employed.  Only  In Poland  Is  a trend  identifiable,  and  here  too it seems  to be  downward,  particularly
for the younger  age groups  (age  55-64).
Explaining  Eariler  Retirement
What  explains  this trend  toward  earlier  retirement?  One  widely  held  view  emphasizes
factors  forcing  or "pushing  workers  out  of their  jobs,  while  the opposing  perspective  contends  that  Opull"
factors  attract  olderworkers  into  retirement  (Intemational  Labor  Office  1989;  Kohli  and  others  1991).  This
distinction  Is obviously  somewhat  arbitrary,  since  for example  the onset  of poor health  can "push"  a
worker  out of his  job, but  also  can  make  leisure  more  attractive  thus  "pulling"  that worker  into  retirement.
Despite  this caveat,  it is useful  to classify  evidence  on these  two hypotheses  for descriptive  purposes.
Evidence  on the "push"  hvyothesis:  This  theory  holds  that people  truly wish  to remain
employed  at older ages, but are forced  from their jobs by declining  productivity  and poor health,
mandatory  retirement  and age  discrimination,  and  structural  shfits  in labor  demand.
Productivity  and Health:  Many believe  that productivity  falls and employee  health
deteriorates  with age, leading  employers  to force out older  employees  when  health  problems  strike.
Indeed,  many  surveys  report  that when  people  are asked  why  they retire,  poor health  is a common
response. 5 Nevertheless,  it Is  difficult  to measure  the independent  effects  of health  problems  on older
persons'  work  behavior,  and in many  countries  people  feel a is socially  acceptable  to retire  because  of10
Table  3
Labor  Force  Partolpatlon  Rates  of Older  Workers,
Selected  Economles  In TransIion
Men  Women
Age  55-59  Age  860-4  Age  65+  Age  55-59  Age  60.64  Age  65+
Bulgaria
(1985)  80.9  39.2  15.2  32.0  16.5  4.3
Czechoslovakia
(1980)  84.2  46.3  19.5  40.8  21.5  6.5
Hungary
(1980)  72.2  13.2  3.9  18.8  8.7  3.2
Poland
(1978)  81.5  62.4  34.9  57.9  37.4  19.4
(1988)  72.0  53.6  32.5  50.6  34.3  19.0
Romania
(1977)  78.7  44.7  15.2  52.5  25.2  10.0
Source:
OECD (1991).  Tabe A.3 p. 17.
poor health,  as compared  to saying  that *they  got tired  of working'. Furthermore,  as shall  be  shown
below,  many  countries  offer  income-support  maintenance  programs  which  require  the applicant  report
he  or she  cannot  work. It has  been  suggested,  therefore,  that  at least  some  older  people  reply  that  they
are in poor heafth  as an ex-Dost  raftonalization  for retiring  at relatively  young  ages  (Fields  and Mitchell
1984b;  Sammartino  1987).
Good-quality  evidence  is  difficult  to obtain  on  the  effect  of poor  health  on retirement.  On
the one hand  we  know  that people  retire  earlier  from  physically  demanding  jobs,  from  jobs where  they
are  exposed  to heavy  machinety  and  equipment,  and  from  jobs  with  extremes  of temperature,  stress,  and
other  unpleasant  working  conditions  (Gustman  and  Steinmeler  1986;  Mitchell  1990).  On  the  other  hand,
these  jobs also tend to offer above  average  pensions,  so earier retirement  may  be due to pension
opportunities  rather  than  because  the workers  are  forced  out. There  Is little  suggestion  that on-the-job11
accidents  and injury  rates  rise  with  age  in the  United  States:  work  accidents  are  lower  for older  than  for
younger  employees,  but little  is known  about  pattems  in other  countries.3
As yet there  is litle evidence  to support  or to refute  the  view  that worsening  health  and
productivity  problems  among older persons  explains  trends  toward  earlier  retirement  in the set of
developed  countries.  If  anything,  most  older  persons  in  developed  nations  are  probably  living  longer  and
in probably  as good health  (if not better)  as compared  to previous  decades.' In developing  countries,
by contrast,  this conclusion  may  not hold  since  urbanization  in many  developing  countries  sometimes
exposes  people  to more  disease,  pollution,  and risk  of injury  than  In wealthier  economies.
Mandatory  retirement  and  age  discrimination:  Retirement  research  over  the last  decade
casts  serious  doubt  on  the  view  that  age  discrimination  and  mandatory  retirement  rules  explain  observed
early  retirement  trends  in developed  countries.
To summarize  the labor  economics  argument,  long-term  compensation  contracts  with
upward-sloping  pay  profiles  are  often  used  as  a means  of spurring  worker  productivity  and ensuring  long
tenure.  Ex  ante,  a long-term  contract  specifies  that  an  employee  will  leave  the  firm  at the point  when  his
total compensation  comes  to exceed  his  total productivity  (Lazear  1979;  Gustman  and others  1992).
From  this perspective,  the age of mandatory  retirement  plays  a central  and valuable  role:  it is the
pre-agreed  point at which  the labor  contract  comes  to an end, after  which  the employee  would be
overpaid  relative  to his  value  to the  firm. Hence  mandatory  retirement  is rationalized  as  an economically
important  phenomenon,  rather  than  as evidence  of employer  age bias  without  economic  rationale.
The hypothesis  that mandatory  retirement  demarcates  the end of a long term labor
contract  is supported  in several  research  studies. In the U.S.  for instance,  individual  companies  (and
unions)  were  originally  permitted  to set  mandatory  retirement  ages  until  a recent  change  in  federal  policy
outlawed  the practice. After  the law was  changed,  companies  responded  by developing  alternative
Inducements  for retirement,  including  pension  incentives  and special  early  retimment  wndow M plans.
In  Japan  many  firms  retire  workers  on  attaining  a retirement  age,  but  do  not necessarily  require  that  older
workers  drop  out  of the  labor  force  - instead,  many  Japanese  employers  re-hire  these  older  workers  (at12
lower  pay) rather  than  forcing  them  out of their  firms  altogether  (Rebick  1993;  Clark  1992). This  fact
suggests  that  mandatory  retirement  plays  the  role  of endpoint  In  a long  term  employment  contract,  rather
simple  age discrimination.
Can mandatory  r,tirement  policy  account  for the entire  trend  to earlier  retirement  over
time,  in developed  countries  and perhaps  in some  developing  countries?  Here  the answer  is probably
no. Even  in the United  States  when  retirement  policy  was  in the firms'  jurisdiction  until  recently,  most
older workers  appear  not to have  been  constrained  by mandatory  retirement  - the vast majority  of
workers  left their  jobs well  prior  to the age  they  would  have  been  'forced out",  and continued  to do so
after  the govemment  lifted  the mandatory  retirement  age  altogether.  While  mandatory  retirement  ages
clearly  played  dffferent  roles  in different  countries  and  times,  it is certain  that mandatony  retirement  policy
cannot  explain  all of the long-term  decline  in labor  force  participation  rates  among  workers  in  their  50's
and 60's.
Even  if mandatory  retirement  is not binding  on most  older  workers,  it may  be  that  there
is  age  discrimination  in  hiring  limiting  older  workers'  job opportunities.  To  establish  the  prevalence  of age
discrimination,  it is necessary  to determine  whether  employers  treat equally  productive  workers  less
generously  simply  because  of age.  Direct  evidence  on this point is scanty,  in part because  of the
difficulty  of holding  worker  productivity  constant  while  comparing  employers'  pay,  hiring  practices,  layoff
and firing  pattems,  and the like. Some  researchers  contend  age discrimination  in employment  is quite
widespread,  a deduction  based  on survey  evidence  showing  that  many  retirees  report  that they  wish  to
work." This  conclusion  requires  a caveat,  however,  since  a self-reported  interest  in employment  does
not  Imply  actual  willingness  to seek  and  take  a job,  nor  does  it reflect  potential  productivity.  In  the United
States,  a recent  study  found  that only  9 percent  of nonworking  men  age  55-65  and 18  percent  over  age
65 reported  that  they  could  not  work  because  of lack  of opportunity.  For  women,  the  figures  were  higher
- 26  percent  of the 55-64  year  old female  nonworkers,  and 11  percent  of those  age  65 and  over  (Fields
and Mitchell  1984b).  These  figures  suggest  that  a fairly  small  percentage  of those  who  want  to find  work
actually  report  that they  are  stymied  for job market  reasons.  Further  examination  of survey  responses13
by those  nonworkers  who indicate  they  might  like  to work,  also  reveals  that  they  have  restrictive  and In
many  cases  quite  unrealistic  perceptions  of their  labor  market  opportunities.  That  Is,  many  have  only  a
very narrow  set of jobs and wage  levels  they are  willing  to accept,  and would  not take  jobs requiring
strenuous  working  conditions  or long  commuting  distances  (Commonwealth  Fund  1990).
A diferent  insight  into  older  persons'  job market  opportunities  comes  from  information
on joblessness  and job finding  after  plant  shutdowns.  Older  persons  displaced  from  their  jobs due to
plant  shutdowns  in the U.S.  apparently  do have  a more  difficult  time  finding  new  work,  as compared  to
younger  employees  displaced  from  the same  firms. Further,  when  they do obtain  employment,  their
eamings  are somewhat  lower  than  younger  persons. However  older  workers,  after  being  displaced,
appear more likely to  remain  in their same industry/occupation,  as compared  to their younger
counterparts.'°  Whether  this  illustrates  employer  bias,  or employee  reluctance  to undertake  investments
such as skill acquis.tion  and migration,  is not yet known.  Additional  studies  on other countries'
experiences  are needed  to examine  this problem  in more  depth.
Structural  Shifts  in Labor  Demand:  Still  another  explanation  for why  older  workers'  labor
market  attachment  has  declined  in  the last  two decades  is that older  workers  may  lack  computer  skills,
or their  human  capital  may  have  depreciated  so much,  that  they  are  passed  over  in favor  of other  more
productive  inputs.  In other  words,  older  workers  may  suffer  disproportionate  job loss  as  a resuit  of a shift
in  the economic  composition  of jobs,  due in part  to structural  shifts  and in  part  to technological  change.
Direct  tests of this hypothesis  have been hampered  by the difficulty  of measuring
structural  shift  and technological  obsolescence,  and direct  measures  of the degree  of substitutability
between  older  and younger  workers  (and  capital)  are  rare."  Evidence  shows,  however,  that the  trend
toward  earlier  retirement  in Europe  and the U.S  has  not been  concentrated  in sectors  experiencing  the
most economic  growth,  nor those  experiencing  the largest  declines. Instead,  eariier  retirement  has
characterized  most  if not  all  the  major  industrial  sectors,  suggesting  that  this  argument  is less  potent  than
at first  it might  seem  (Jacobs  and others  1991a  and b; Pampel  and Weiss  1983).14
Evidence  on the Opull*  hypothesis:  An altemative  explanation  for the trend  to earlier
retirement  is that many  older workers  leave  employment  because  they value  leisure  and home  time
strongly.  Overtime,  factors  which  permit,  f not  encourage,  older  workers  to withdraw  from  the  wage  labor
market  have become  more Important,  particularly  retirement  income  levels,  and retirement  Income
Incentives.  Income  levels  are  determined  by public  and  private  pensions,  family  support,  and  other  assets
available  during  retirement.  Retirement  incentives  are  determined  by comparing  the utility  of additional
Income  received  as  a result  of continued  work  offset  by less  leisure  or time  spent  at home,  with  the utility
of retirement  activities  and any pension  or other  benefits  receivable  after  retirement.
The Role  of Economic  Factors:  Research  over  the  last  decade  has  demonstrated  that
economic  factors  prove  to be  an  extremely  Important  dete.iinant of the  retirement  decision.  Never  the
less  a precise  measure  of their  effects  is available  for only  a few countries.' 2 In the United  States,  for
example,  economic  factors  appear  to account  for about  75 percent  of explained  variation  in retirement
ages,  as  compared  to health  factors  which  account  for only  25  percent.  These  economic  factors  include
wage  eamings  while  employed,  and private  pension  as well  as Social  Security  payments  when  retired.
Such  financial  factors  have  two offsetting  effects,  however,  which  must  be clearly  distinguished.  First,
economists  emphasize  that  workers  with  more  retirement  Income  retire  earlier,  whether  i Is  from  public
or  private  sources.  Second,  there  is  a complex  interaction  between  Income  and  substitution  effects  which
occurs  when  workers  are  offered  more  income  to delay  retirement.  Existing  evidence  on men  suggests
that  for  a reasonable  range  of policy  changes,  the  substitution  effect  tends  to overcome  the  income  effect.
In other  words,  for men,  raising  the reward  for deferring  retirement  tends  to induce  some  delay  in the
retirement  age.
Having  said  that  eamings  and  pension  opportunHies  matter,  it should  be  emphasized  that
the particular  institutional  details  of public  and private  retirement  programs  must  be understood  in  order
to evaluate  how  older  workers  adapt  their  work  pattems  in response  to retirement  systems.  Thus,  for
instance,  the Swedish  public  pension  system  permits  a worker  to accept  his  pension  annuity  and remain
employed  part-time,  a practice  which  produces  higher  employment  rates  among older Swedes  as15
compared  to virtually  any other  Westem  European  nation. In the United  States,  in contrast,  retirees
earning  above  an annual  threshold  amount  have  their  social  security  pension  reduced  by one-half  to
two-thirds,  and pay  income  tax  on a portion  of remaining  benefits;  partly  as a result  of these  restrictions,
labor  supply  among  the elderly  in the US  is quite  low.
Clearly  retirement  systems  can  and do  affect  work  incentives  at older  ages. This  Is  best
seen  by noting  that when  retirement  is delayed,  additional  pay  (and  ultimately  later  pension  benefits)  is
earned,  and  then  must  be compared  with  the benefits  foregone  by  an  additional  year  of work. If retums
from work drop sharply  at a particular  age, such as In Japan  when workers  attain  the mandatory
retirement  age,  the "pull"  of the  pension  may  be  enough  to Induce  early  retirement  (Rebick  1993).  This
calculation  also  depends  on the  specific  pension  rules  In  place:  that Is,  a benefit  reduction  factor  Is  often
used  to lower  the retiree's  monthly  pension  benet If he elects  to retire  early,  on the grounds  that  the
early  commencement  of monthly  payments  makes  the present  value  of the lifetime  benefit  paid  equal  in
actuarial  terms  to the regular,  higher  benefit  (the  lower  benefit  for early  retirement  is received  over  a
longer  period  of time).
Evaluating  pension  Incentives  for dffferent  retirement  ages  thus  requires  one  to compare
the present  value  of (net)  benefit  streams  at all feasible  retirement  ages. Thus  for instance,  a pension
plan  which  pays  'lullu  benefits  at age 65  would  be  actuarially  neutral  if it reduces  benefits  by about  50
percent  for an age-55  retiree  - in present  value  terms,  the age-55  and the age-65  benefits  would  be
roughly  equal. 13 Many  public  sector  employers  and  the majority  of private  sector  pension  plans,  are  not
neutral,  however,  at times  strongly  subsidizing  early  retirement  by offering  payments  of 75 or even  100
percent  of the age-65  benefit  for those  leaving  early (Fields  and Mitchell  1984b;  Leonesio  1993). In
contrast,  the  Japanese  national  retirement  system  has  the  opposite  feature,  paying  only  55  percent  of the
full  benefit  for someone  retiring  at age  60,  instead  of the  higher  benefit,  around  70  percent,  which  would
make  pension  wealth  and work  incentives  neutral  (Myers  1991).
Plans  are  sometimes  influential  in  work  decisions  at later  ages  as  well,  such  as  when  work
beyond  the "normal"  retirement  age yields  benefit  increases  which  are  too small,  or too large,  to be16
actuarially  neutral.  Penalties  for continued  work  beyond  the normal  retirement  age occur  when  a plan
offers  benefit  enhancements  which  do  not  offset  the  now-shorter  retirement  period.  This  is  quite  common
among  private  sector  plans  in  the United  States,  where  continued  work  after  age  65,  and  sometimes  even
after  age  60,  Is  often  penalized  (Luzadis  and  Mitchell  1991).  In contrast,  social  security  retirement  pension
rules  in  the  United  States  are  roughly  actuarially  neutral  for those  working  beyond  age  65,  while  in  Japan,
work  between  the  ages  of 65  and 70  yields  benefits  higher  by  88 percent  instead  of the more  actuarially
neutral  40  percent  (Myers  1991).  These  retirement  system  Incentives  influence  workers'  decisions  about
when  to retire,  and must  be  a central  focus  of those  seeking  to alter  retirement  pattems  and trends.
It should  also  be  noted  that  in  many  countries  private  and  public  pension  systems  interact
In such  a way  that benefit  formulas  include  cascading  or cumulative  effects  on retirement  incentives."'
Furthermore,  as has  been  i-c  m'xnized  in  a few  recent  studies  of retirement  trends  in  Westem  Europe,  the
availability  of other, non-pension  income  transfer  programs  also interacts  closely  with the penslon
schemes  to influence  the relative  appeal  of retirement  at young  ages. For  example,  as will  be  discussed
below,  unemployment  relief  and disability  benefit  systems  sometimes  offer  altemative  routes  out of the
workplace  for persons  seeking  altematives  to the  job market.  Though  existing  studies  are  thus  far  mainly
descriptive,  they tend to support  the view that these  other  transfer  programs  have  generated  new
pathways  to retirement  which  to some  extent  work outside  the regular  public  and private  pension
systems.
Researchers  are  currently  examining  whether  the long  term  trend  toward  early  retirement
can be explained  adequately  by analyzing  changes  over time In pension  plan characteristics  and
formula-driven  benefit  reduction  or increase  factors. There  is some  evidence  that these  have,  in fact,
played  a powerful  role. Incentives  to retire  early  have  strengthened  In many  nations  over  the last  four
decades,  and  these  benefit  increases  seem  to "track"  declining  labor  supply  pattems  quite  closely. In a
study using  US  aggregate  data,  Levine  (1993)  found  that average  social  security  retirement  benefits
predicted  men's  labor  force  participation  fairly  well,  and certainly  much  better  than  a simple  time  trend17
would.  More research  is needed  on this topic, particularly  using Individual-level  survey  data now
becoming  available  in many  developed  and developing  countries.' 6
Other  Factors:  It should  be  emphasized  that  in some  nations,  older  persons  retire  from
the paid  labor  market  to engage  not  In leisure  activities,  but  in  self  employment  and/or  home  production.
In Hungary,  for example,  where  large  segments  of the older  population  report  working  in agriculture,
retirement  has  signified  a change  in industry  and occupation  -- a movement  away  from the state-run
system  to the non-socialist  sector  (Szalai  1991).
B. Retirement  Systems  In Practice
Over  the last  two  decades,  many  nations  have  developed  innovative  policies  influencing
retirement  and work pattems,  including  (but not limited  to) private  and public pension  systems. A
'traditional"  motivation  for this increased  attention  to retirement  policy  has  been  demographic  aging  --
there  are increasing  numbers  of persons  requiring  old-age  income  support. The  population  and labor
force  estimates  discussed  above  imply  growing  concern  along  this dimension,  given  expected  aging
trends.  A less  traditional,  but  increasingly  common,  rationale  for the  new  concem  about  retirement  policy
Is  the  fact  that  many  nations  have  been  adapting  their  retirement  systems  in  times  of slack  labor  demand,
increasingly  providing  generous  retirement  payments  in lieu  of unemployment  payments.
Benefits  and financing  arrangements  of retirement  systems  differ  greatly  across  the set
of developed  countries,  as  well  as  their  reliance  on private  market  provision,  government  regulation,  and
government  provision.  Despite  these  differences,  it appears  that many  nations  have  increasingly  relied
on multiple-pillar  systems  to draw older  workers  out of the labor  force. A review  of experience  from
developed  countries  shows  that many public retirement  systems  made early retirement  financially
attractive  in the last decade. Such  offerings  included  low early  retirement  eligibility  ages,  generous
pension  and  other  benefit  levels,  and  strong  disincentives  to remain  employed  at older  ages.  High  payroll
tax rates  also  characterize  many  public  retirement  plans.18
An Overview  of Multiple-Pillar  Retirement  Systems
It Is useful  to employ  a common  conceptual  framework  for comparing  multiple  pillar
retirement  systems  across  countries.  Following  a brief  overview  of these  systems,  key  benefit  and  funding
features  of retirement  systems  are  Identified,  Including  both  public  and  private  schemes.  Overall  strengths
and weaknesses  of public  versus  private  systems  are then  sketched. Specffic  effects  of retirement
systems  on labor  and capital  markets  are  taken  up In the next  section.'
Most  developed  and developing  countries  have  some  form of old-age  income  support
systems.  Nevertheless,  they  differtremendously  in  structureand  impact  both  within  and  across  countries,
eaming  the designation  of "multiple-pillar  systems.  This  concept  reflects  the  fact  that old age support
usually  derives  from  a number  of sources  Including  public  pensions  (e.g.  social  security  retirement  plans),
private  group mechanisms  (e.g. company  pensions), and family  and other private  support (e.g.
self-insurance,  Individual  saving,  children's  support).  The  mix  of plans  differs  greatly  across  nations,  and
indeed  In some  cases  different  workers  within  a particular  country  may  be covered  by vastly  different
programs.  Hence  understanding  multiple  pillar  retirement  systems  requires  leaming  a great  deal  about
many  diverse  public  and private  pension  institutions,  which  vary  greatly  across  countries  and even  within
a country.
In addition  to understanding  pension  institutions,  it is important  to point  out that many
other  public  and private  programs  influence  retirement,  sometimes  intentionally  and other  times  not. In
many  European  countries,  for instance,  unemployment  insurance  and disability  benefits  were offered
during  the 1980's  as a form of subsidized  early retirement,  with the goal of permitting  employers  to
substitute  younger  workers  for those  older  individuals  wlho  could  then  retire  early,  and absorbing  what
were  perceived  as *redundant"  older  workers  from  the unemployment  rolls. These  altemative  paths  to
eariy retirement  were widely  used. Lenient  eligibility  rules  produced  higher  disability  rates  in some
countries  such  as  the Netherlands,  which  had  1,033  disability  recipients  per  1,000  labor  force  participants
age 60  64,  for example,  while  the United  States  had only  one-quarter  as many  (Kohli  and others  1991;
Burkhauser  1993).19
Key Feature of Retirement  Systems
Retirement  systems  in most countries  are extremely  complex,  particularly  when  plans
interact  and overlap  to create  an institutionally  complex  web  of rules.  In addition,  multiple-pillar  systems
behave  differently  depending  on each  country's  specific  mix  of public  and  private  components.  A brief
description  of the  two most  important  aspects  of retirement  plans  is offered  to aid in understanding  how
the many  different  approaches  to retirement  systems  work: benefits  and  financing.  Instead  of cataloging
all possible  retirement  systems,  the key characteristics  common  to most plans  are  identified,  making
reference  to Individual  country  plans  in selected  Instances.  Unless  otherwise  noted,  specific  country
retirement  system  examples  throughout  this  section  are  taken  from  Tables  4 and S  describing  retirement
system  characteristics  in OECD  nations.
1. Retirement  System  Coveraae  Rules  and  Practice:  Whom  does  a country's  retirement
system  cover,  and which  aroups  are 3xcluded  by law  or de facto  from participation?
In many  countries,  participation  In  a formal  retirement  system  is restricted  to citizens  who
are wage  and salary  workers,  and in some  cases  only fractions  of the entire  workforce  are  covered."
At  times,  one  tier of the retirement  system  is limited  in coverage  but other  tiers  are  unrestricted.  Thus
in Finland  for instance,  five years  of residence  suffice  for coverage  under  the basic public  pension
scheme  which  does  not  require  citzenship.  Japan,  by  contrast,  allows  only  resident  citizens  to be  eligible
for  the basic  pension  plan,  though  residency  is not  required  for a second  tier  of employees'  pension.  As
a result,  coverage  rates  vary  widely  across  countries.  For example  in the United  States,  most private
sector  workers  are  covered  by  a public  social  security  pension  system,  but  only  about  45  percent  by  the
private  retirement  system.20
Table 4
Retirement Ages In OECD Public and Private Pension Systems
Public  Pension  Systems  Private  Pension  Systems
Normal  Early  Early  Normal  Early
Retirement  Ae  Retirement  Age. M&etirement  Ace. WomerRetirement  Aae  Retirement  Age
Country  Men  Women  Low  High  Low  High  Men  Women  Men  Women
Australia  65  60  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Austria  65  60  55  60  50  55  65  60  N/A  N/A
Belgium  65  60  55  64  55  55  65  60  60  55
Canada  65  65  60  64  60  64  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Denmark  67  67  60  66  60  66  67  62  60  60
Finland  65  65  60  64  60  64  65  65  55  55
France  60  60  55  60  55  60  60  60  55  55
Germany  65  65  58  63  58  63  65  65  N/A  N/A
Greece  65  60  62  65  55  56  65  60  55  50
Iceland  67  67  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Ireland  66  66  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  65  65  50  50
Italy  60  55  55  56  55  56  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Japan  65  65  60  64  60  64  60  60  N/A  N/A
Luxembourg  65  65  60  60  60  60  65  60  N/A  N/A
Netherlands  65  65  60  62  60  62  65  65  N/A  N/A
New Zealand  60  60  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Norway  67  67  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  67  67  N/A  N/A
Portugal  65  62  55  60  55  60  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Spain  65  65  64  64  64  64  65  65  N/A  N/A
Sweden  65  65  60  64  60  64  65  65  55  55
Switzerland  65  62  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  65  62  N/A  N/A
Turkey  55  50  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
United  Kingdom  65  60  60  64  59  64  65  60  50  50
United States  65  65  62  62  62  62  65  65  55  55
Mean
All OECD  64.25  62.54  58.88  62.47  58.12  61.12  64.65  59.72  55  53.89
Europe  64.71  62.88  58.50  62.29  57.57  60.64  64.93  62.73  55  53.75
North America  65  65  61  63  61  63  65  65  55  55
Oceania  62.50  60  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Other  62.33  60.67  60  64  60  64  60  60  N/A  N/A
Notes:
N/A:  data not available
Source: Data  Appendix available  on request.21
Table 5
Other  Plan Characterlstics  of OECD  Public  and Private  Pension  Systems
Public  Pension  Systems  Private  Pension
Systems
ReDlacement  Rate  (married)  Earninas  ceiling*  Financina**Replacement  Rate  Financina*
Country  I%  Non-ag.  pay)  (%  Mfg.  pay)  Employer  %
Employee  %
Australia  24  22.1  1  3  N/A  67  33
Austria  N/A  N/A  1  4  70  N/A  N/A
Belgium  37,5  37.5  1  4  65  N/A  N/A
Canada  44.7  37.8  1  6  N/A  72  28
Denmark  N/A  33  0  7  75  67  33
Finland  N/A  28.1  N/A  4  60  N/A  N/A
France  50  50  1  5  57  60  40
Germany  68  68.5  1  4  55  89  11
Greece  N/A  N/A  N/A  4  80  N/A  N/A
Iceland  28.5  N/A  N/A  0  N/A  N/A  N/A
Ireland  N/A  26.7  N/A  4  N/A  N/A  N/A
Italy  N/A  N/A  N/A  4  57  N/A  N/A
Japan  35.6  N/A  N/A  7  50  100  0
Luxembourg  72.7  72.7  1  4  N/A  N/A  N/A
Netherlands  25.1  27.5  0  10  N/A  74  26
New  Zealand  29.6  30  N/A  3  N/A  N/A  N/A
Norway  N/A  50.7  1  4  52  N/A  N/A
Portugal  N/A  N/A  1  4  N/A  N/A  N/A
Spain  30.7  31.6  1  4  75  N/A  N/A
Sweden  N/A  63.6  1  0  N/A  100  0
Switzerland  21.6  21.6  1  4  60  58  42
Turkey  N/A  N/A  1  5  N/A  N/A  N/A
United  Kingdom  20.5  21.4  1  4  40  73  27
United  States  41.7  41.7  1  4  55  87  13
Mean
All OECD  37.87  39.09  0.88  60.79  77  23
Europe  40.76  40.99  0.85  62.17  74.43
25.57
North  America  43.20  39.75  1.00  55  79.50
20.50
Oceania  26.80  26.05  1.00  N/A  67  33
Other  32.05  N/A  1.00  50  100  0
Notes:
N/kA data  not available
*  arringB  oalling  used  In oomputing  tax base for payroll  lax
I -yes
0-no
*Financdng  and contoributons:
0=govemment  and  employer
1 -employee  only
2-employer only
3  govmment only
4-all  three
5-employee & employer  only
8-govermment: universal  pension;  employee  and  employer.  eamings  related  pension
7-govemrment  & employee:  universal  pension:  employee  & employer:  eamirigs  related  pension
10-govemrment  & employee
Source:  Data  Appendix  avallable  on request.22
Uneven  coverage  produces higher benefits  for employees  participating  in national  and
occupational  systems,  but may  leave  more  vulnerable  workers  who  are uncovered. Of particular  concern
is the situation  of immigrants  who  &re often excluded  from ret',ement  plan coverage  due to participation
rules requiring  citizenship. These  barriers  to mobility  will become increasingly  restrictive  as the Westem
European  job market opens up in the next decade,  and may hamper labor  flows across  the community
of economies  in transition,  as they begin to experience  more flexible  labor markets (Commission  of the
European  Communities  1991).
In addiion to national  or occupational  pension plans,  retirement  systems  often include
private  income  support mechanisms.  These  can  include  benefits  offered  by labor  or social  organizations,
family groups, or even individual  retirement  savings  accounts. Cross country differences  in the private
"pillarm  of the multiple  pillar  system  defy  a common  classification  scheme. Nevertheless,  a careful  analysis
of the multiple aspects of a nation's retirement  system requires  a full review of retiree  income support
offered  by the private sector.'"
2. Retirement  System  Entitlement  Reauirements  and Practice:  What reauirements  must
be met in order to receive  benefits,  and what kinds of peoDle  can meet  these requirements?
Most formal pension plans require covered workers to be employed some minimum
number  of years in order to be eligible  for retirement  benefits,  though the range of eligibility  requirements
is fairly  wide and varies  both within  and across  countries. Thus  in the United  States,  individuals  must be
employed  in covered  jobs for at least  10  years  in order to be  entitled  to social  security  pensions,  whereas
a maximum  of 5 years  of participation  is typically required  in order  to become entitled  to private  pension
benefits. In other countries,  employees  must also fulfill a certain number  of years of work immediately
prior to retirement;  for example  in New  Zealand,  7 years  of work within the 10  years before  retirement  are
required  for public pension  benefit  entitlement,  while in Spain  a total of 10  years of coverage  is required,
including at least  5 years in the 10 years immediately  preceding  retirement.
Many countries also have special government, or mandated occupational, pension
programs  covering particular  industries  or economic sectors. These  generally  require  employment  for23
a specified  number of years in that sector before  a worker becomes  entitled  to benefits. For example,
many developed  countries offer special pensions to public sector employees,  military and diplomatic
personnel, miners, and farmers; a similar pattern of special pensions has existed in many transition
economies  such  as Hungary  and Poland  as well.  These  special  plans  frequently  offer more generous  and
earlier  benefits  than do the regular public and private  retirement  plans,  and their entitlement  rules can
make  workers  unwilling  to change jobs  for fear of losing or lowering  their pension. In assessing  the way
a retirement  system  works, then, it Is important  to distinguish  between  coverage  and benefit  entitlement
rules in formal retirement  income programs.
3. Rules  Governing  Benefit  Eliaibility  and Receipt: What is required  to receive  retirement
benefits, and how do benefits  chanae when workers retire early  or late?
Most retirement  programs  specify  that covered individuals  attain a specified  age, or age
plus service,  In  prder to begin receiving  "normal"  benefit payments  defined according to an unreduced
or "full" benefit formula.  The normal retirement age varies across OECD nations and even within
countries: in the United States,  for instance,  it has been  age 65 under  the social security  system but as
young as age 55 in some private  pension  plans. In  Japan,  the public plan requires  age  65 for full benefits
but many private  plans permit  full benefits  at age 60 (Tables  4 and 5). Looking  across OECD  countries,
most public  and private  plans  set their  normal  retirement  age  at  65  for men (the country  weighted  average
is just over age 64) and somewhat  earlier  for women (the  public plan  average  is 62.5  and the private  plan
average is 59.7 years of age).
In line with the trend to earlier  retirement  noted above, workers  frequently  retire at ages
other than the normal  age.  Early  retirement  ages range  from a low of 55 to 64 in public plans,  averaging
between  age 59  to 62. OECD  country private  pensions  tend  to allow even earlier  retirement,  around  age
55 as a rule. Those  electing  to retire prior to the normal  retirement  age generally  receive  reduced  annual
benefits. Delayed  retirement,  which means retiring  later  than  the plan's specified  normal  age, frequently
produces annual benefit  amounts  which exceed  the normal or full benefit.24
Benefit  eligibility  rules  also vary along other dimensions. Some countries  have  a means
test, and reduce  or cut benefits  to those with income,  or assets,  higher  than a threshold,  as in Australia.
Other countries have a work test, permitting benefit receipt only among those who have little or no
earnings. For example  In  the United  States,  older  workers  have  their social  security  retirement  payments
reduced  by 50 percent  If earnings  exceed  a threshold.  Such rules  have  the effect  of targeting retirement
benefits  on the needy, enhancing  the welfare  aspect  of the plan  and reducing  the earnings-replacement
fnsurance  aspect. They also tend to reduce work incentives  for those subject to the test.
Not all nations discourage work among the older population: for example Sweden
encourages  its older citizens  to remain  employed under its partial retirement  option, by allowing older
persons  to work part time and continue  receiving  pension  benefits. As a result, labor  force participation
rates  of older persons in Sweden  are among the highest  of  the developed  world. It should  also be noted
that as benefits  rise,  and eligibility  requirements  become  more restrictive  (including  means  tests),  peoples'
Incentives  to  misrepresent  their eligibility and/or degree of d..ability  Increases, and this becomes
particula,ly  a problem when record keeping  is less  than perfect.
4. Retirement Benefit Amounts:  How are benefits determined, and how do they vary in
different  states  of the economv? Are benefits  real  or nominal? How are benefits  from different  proarams
intearated.  and how are these taxed?
Benefits  received under a retirement  system vary according to whether the plans offer
benefits  according to a specified  formula, or whether benefits  are determined  by contribution  amounts.
Defined benefit plans are most typical of publicly provided retirement  plans and, in most countries,
employer-sponsored  plans  as well. In such  a plan, annual benefits  are specified  according  to a formula
based on years of service  and pay, and benefits  are frequently  two-tier in nature: the first-tier  is a flat or
minimum pension, and the second tier focuses more closely on earnings replacement. The relative
importance of the first-tier flat benefit versus the second-tier earnings-based  component varies from
country  .o country. In Hungary,  for Instance,  roughly  two-thirds  of all retirees  are said  to be receiving  only
the minimum  or welfare  pension, while in Canada  and West Germany  more emphasis  was traditionally25
placed on earnings  replacement. Defined  benefit plans which emphasize  minimum  benefits  tend to be
more redistributive  than the earnings-based  plans, though even in the latter some formulas cap the
amount of earnings  that can be credited toward the retirement  benefit,  or the benefit replacement  rate
Is structured so as to replace lower-paid  workers' wages at a higher rate than higher-paid  workers. As
will be demonstrated  below, such benefit formulas have differential  effects on work incentives  for the
lower-paid  and those earning more.
Defined contribution plans, by contrast, specify not the benefit formula but rather the
amount to be contributed  to the worker's  account. The monies  are then invested  until  retirement.  In this
type of plan  the worker bears investment  risk since  most defined  contribution plans do not guarantee  a
minimum pension  nor a particular  replacement  rate on earnings. Since  early retirement  spreads  benefit
receipt over a longer  period of time, early retirement  also requires  actuarial  reduction  of benefits. These
reductions  are large:  for example,  in the United  States,  an age-55  retiree  with a defined  contribution  plan
would receive  about half the benefits  of a worker  retiring  at age 65  (McGill  and Grubbs 1989). In  contrast,
many defined benefit  plans subsidize  early retirement  by paying early retirees  more than half the normal
benefit  amount (Fields and Mitchell  1984a). Since subsidies  discourage  work incentives  (see the next
section),  it is important  for analysts  of a retirement  system  to determine  whether  and how  the net present
value of retirement  annuity  flows vary with retirement  age. An actuarially  fair plan would be consistent
with constant net present value  amounts  as retirement  is delayed.
Consideration  of benefits  under  retirement  systems  also  requires  attention  to how  benefits
respond  to other considerations.  One issue  is how benefits  are affected  by inflation:  some plans  partially
or fully index  payments,  while many others  do not. For example,  retirees  under  the social security  system
in the United States  receive  nominal increases  as long as the inflation  rate exceeds  3 percent (Tables  4
and 5).  Canada and the United Kingdom offer indexed assets held by private pension plans, which
enhances  benefit security  of private  pension  holdings. In many  other cases,  however,  public  and private
retirement  benefits  erode in real  value  with inflation. Tax  policy  toward benefits  also varies:  when  benefits
are subject to taxation,  this reduces  their net value  and hence  their  attractiveness.  Integration  of benefits26
across many plans is also very  important,  and takes  a variety  of guises. One form of integration  occurs
when many programs are overlaid:  thus older workers may retire under one plan (e.g. a private_  or
disability  plan) and then transition  to the regular  social security  pension when  the rctiree is old enough.
This has been particularly  important in Western  European  nations  where unemployment  Insurance  and
disability  pensions were used during the 1980s  to remove  many older persons from the labor pool. A
different  kind  of integration  arises  when  retirees'  pension  payments  are reduced  by other payments,  such
as disability  or workers' compensation  systems. Last  but not least,  i  benefits  fluctuate  over  time with the
health of the economy, or with demographic characteristics,  these fluctuations will also affect older
workers'  assessment  of likely  benefit  security. Sometimes  the government  guarantees  minimum  benefits,
which changes  the risk characteristics  of the retirement  benefit promise considerably. For example,  in
Chile the government cor,.;..ues  to guarantee  a minimum pension even though the national pension
system  is a mostly-private  mandatory  national  defined contribution system.'@
Analysts examining how a retirement  system affects economic behavior  will typically
require  a careful  understanding  of these benefit  formulas  and benefit eligibility  rules in order to carefully
assess  what retirement  systems  benefit promises  are. In general,  replacement  rate calculations  are an
inadequate  method of summarizing  benefit  formulas  and the complex structure of the benefit promise.
Nonetheless,  many analysts  refer to these as a summary  statistic representing  benefit  generosity. With
appropriate caveats  understood, the evidence  shows  that public plan replacement  rates  across OECD
nations  stood at about 38 percent,  and private  plans replaced  about 60 percent of average  pay (Tables
4 and 5).
5. Payina  for Retirement  Systems: Are contributions  mandatory  or voluntary.  who pavs
them, and how do they vary in different states of the economy? If voluntaly Plans  are available,  do
contributions  receive  anv special  tax treatment? If mandatort,  taxes  are collected.  how do these affect
labor costs?
When retirement  plans  are mandated  nationally,  as in the case  of social security  systems
and some occupational  pension schemes,  they are often paid for with a payroll tax levied on wage  and27
salary  workers (and sometimes  on the self-employed).  Tax rates  vary widely  across countries,  and are
sometimes  levied  only on earned  income  up to a cap, which opens such  retirement  systems to charges
of regressivity. (On the other hand, such plans often  do not recognize  eamings above the cap for the
purposes of benefit computation,  which lessens  the force of this charge.) In mandatory  systems  there
Is also the recurring policy concern that high payroll tax rates make labor more expensive,  inducing
employers  to either evade  taxes  by redefining  pay in new  ways, or to substitute  away  from labor in favor
of capital.  If, In addition, there Is an uncovered  sector of the labor force not subject to payroll  taxes,
employment can become concentrated  in the uncovered  sector, with an offsetting  decline in covered
sector jobs.  (Evidence  on these points is offered  in the next  section). Finally,  in the case of mandatory
retirement  systems,  there is the very difficult  issue of determining  how mandated  contributions  change
with the state of the economy. This is important  in addressing  whether retirement  system contributions
can be flexible  enough to guarantee  promised  benefits  in slow economic  times,  and also in the long run
as the population age mix changes.
When a retirement scheme is voluntarily provided, it may be offered by employers,
workers and their labor groups, other social organizations,  or a mix of these. Frequently  contributions
to these accounts  are negotiated  in a collective  agreement,  and often national  governments  encourage
these accounts by granting them a tax-preferred  status.  Individual  retirement  accounts have  also been
tried in some developed nations such as the United States,  where special  tax breaks are available  to
those depositing funds in accounts directed  toward retirement  savings. A full picture of the retirement
system's multiple pillars requires  assessing  the tax preferences  granted  to such accounts as well.
6. Retirement  System  Assets and Administrative  Performance: How are contributions
invested. if it is a funded system, or is the system organized  an pay-as-you-go  arrangement? Is the
retirement  system  administratively  efficient?  How well does it manaqe  its portfolio?
Nationally-run  retirement  plans  are generally  operated  on  a paY-as-you-no  (PAYGO)  basis,
which means that taxes collected in a given year are used to pay benefits  in that year.  Most national
plans  are unfunded, though more rarely,  national plans  may be partly funded (which implies  that some28
of the  taxes  collected  are invested  rather  than paid out immediately).  Here  too, however,  plan assets  tend
to fall short of  the full amount needed  to pay promised  future benefits.  In  such systems,  benefits  paid out
often bear little  relationship  to taxes  paid in, either  for individuals  or for entire generations  of participants.
A major rationale  for PAYGO  plans is that such systems  are able to provide benefits  to
a "start-upu or transition generation of retirees needing old-age income protection, who did not save
enough in advance to achieve retirement  security. A related explanation  is that an unfunded system
provides  a support mechanism  for a poor cohort, or poor members  of a cohort, by future generations  of
workers. Hence redistributional  goals are often  deemed  central  to PAYGO  systems. Detractors  of these
systems  argue that PAYGO  systems  have undesirable  market effects,  mainly (1) reducing savings  by
substituting public indebtedness  for privately-held  retirement  capital, and (2) reducing labor supply by
transferring  wealth  to relatively  less  well-off  cohorts. Evidence  on these contentions  is offered  in the next
section.
In contrast to  PAYGO  plans,  funded retirement plans have contributions which are
invested,  and eventual  retirement  benefits  are then directly linked  to asset performance. Many privately
provided pension plans are fully funded, by which is meant retirement  benefits  depend directly on an
actuarial  division  of the retiring  workers'  available  asset  pool. For  example,  in a defined  contribution  plan,
each working generation pays contributions which are then invested in a well-diversified  portfolio of
financial  instruments. As each cohort retires,  it then receives  the expected  present  value  of its portfolio
in annuity form.  Supporters of funded retirement  plans emphasize  that (1) these plans offer old-age
insurance  without imposing redistribution  across generations,  and (2) because  funded plans generate
savings,  these plans have been said to increase  national  saving  and expand domestic capital markets.
Detractors  emphasize  the lack of redistribution  present  in these systems,  and  argue that funded systems
may be risky when their assets are subject to capital market  fluctuations  and political  manipulation.
In the last decade an intermediate  form of plan funding has received  a great deal of
attention,  combining features  of both  funded and PAYGO  systems. A much-discussed  example  is found
in the Chilean  national defined contribution pension plan, which in 1981  replaced the previous social29
security  PAYGO  system.  The  Chilean  plan  Is  best  viewed  as  an  intermediate  system  since,  like  a defined
contribution  plan, it required  that worker  contributions  be invested  in a pension  fund. However,  the
govemment  initially  restricted  fund  Investments  to Chilean  assets,  and  mainly  to govemment  bonds,  rather
than requiring  it to have  an intemationally  diversified  portfollo.20  In addition,  the Chilean  govemment
continues  to serve  as guarantor  of the  system  in many  ways,  including  the promise  of a minimum  benefit
payable  irrespective  of actual  fund performance.  In the mid-19809  the govemment  also bailed  out the
country's  financial  institutions,  including  the national  pension  fund.
Irrespective  of whether  a retirement  plan  is  PAYGO,  fullyfunded,  or  in between,  a well-run
system  should  be administratively  efficient. Many  nations  have  apparently  suffered  problems  in this
regard,  with negative  rates  of return  characterizing  many  Latin  American  countries. Well  performing
systems  have been identfied in which administrative  costs total only one or two percent  of total
collections,  whereas  other  national  systems  are reported  to spend  up to 20 percent  on administrative
costs. 21 Data  problems  also  plague  many  countries  making  the  transition  away  from  a socialist  system;
for ,nstance,  eamings  records  are  apparently  unavailable  in Hungary  and Poland  despite  the retirement
system's  need  to link  benefits  with  wage  histories.  In other  countries  no data  were  kept  on employees'
years  of coverage  under  the retirement  system,  making  it almost  impossible  to determine  benefits.  This
clearly  opens  the possibility  for fraudulent  claims  and massive  administrative  inefficiencies.
Strength*  and Weaknesses  of Public  and Private  Retirement  Systems
Having  reviewed  some  of the key  institutional  features  of retirement  systems,  it remains
to address  the overall  rationales  for public  versus  private  plans  more  generally.  This section  reviews
several  important  motivations  for the  different  pillars  of a multiple-pillarsystem.  Depending  on  a country's
needs  and abilities,  one or another  mix may be more  appropriate. Since  retirement  systems  offer
retirement  insurance,  it is important  to ask how the insurance  varies  with  characteristics  of the group
being  covered,  the nature  of the benefits  being  provided,  and the  funding  mechanisms  used  to pay  for
the coverage.30
Group  characteristics  matter  for the adverse  selection  Problem,  which  arises  because
individuals  will  always  have  better  "private"  information  about  their  heafth  and  their  life  expectancies,  than
will an external  business  or government  agent. A retirement  plan  that permits  members  to enter  and
leave  voluntarily  will suffer  from adverse  selection,  because  those who expect  to have a short lIfe
expectancy  leave,  and  those  who  expect  to live  a long  time  In  retirement  will  remain.  As a result  voluntary
group  plans  will either  be  forced  to charge  higher  rates  as a result  of this unbalancing  of the risk  pool,
or may  simply  fail  to develop. 22 In contrast,  making  a retirement  plan  universal  spreads  the risk  across
the larger  population  and avoids  this form of adverse  selection.23  Of course,  strictly  speaking,  this
explains  why  many  retirement  systems  are  mandatory,  but  does  not necessarily  entail  public  provision
of the plan. Private  or family  provision  of retirement  income  support  may  be less  subject  to this  type  of
adverse  selection  as compared  to worker  groups,  to the extent  that membership  in the family  is not
voluntary  (Kotlikoff  and Spivak  1981).
Moral  hazard  arises  in  a number  of forms  in retirement  plans. One  aspect  has  to do  with
retirement  decisions:  many  retirement  plans  pay  benefits  only  after  withdrawal  from  the  labor  market,  and
especially  in public plans,  pay benefits  according  to a redistributive  formula. Thus  for example  the
Japanese  government  provides  a two-tier  social  security  system,  with  the  first  tier  consisting  of a uniform
fiat benefit  for all citizens.  Similar  plans,  though  offering  different  guarantee  levels,  are  available  in many
other  developed  countries  as well. Offering  a flat benefit  raises  the possibility  that some  persons  able
to work  will  instead  retire  sooner  than  they  would  otherwise.  A discussion  of empirical  evidence  on this
point is left to the next  section;  nevertheless,  it seems  likely  that types  of benefit  plans  would  be less
susceptible  to moral hazard  than  others. For Instance,  a pure defined  contribution  plan avoids  this
problem  by fully  adjusting  benefits  so as  to make  the worker's  pension  wealth  constant  irrespective  of
his  or her retirement  age. Also,  when  retirees  must  rely  on  family  members  to care  for them,  they  may
tend  to work  longer  instead  of imposing  on their  families  and/or  reducing  their  likely  bequests. 24
Another  factor  motivating  public  intervention  in retirement  systems  relies  on externalities.
For  example,  some  taxpayers  may  suffer  externalities  when  other  people  fail  to insure  themselves  against31
old-age poverty,  and taxpayers  must support  them. This argument  has been offered  when elderly  wind
up without medical  care, nursing home  care, or adequate  housing. In this case, it has been  argued that
govemment  intervention  is required  in the establishment  of a mandatory retirement  income  system into
which all must pay, and from which all may benefit  at least  at a minimum  level  of support. What remains
less clear is whether government  provision of the benefit Itself  Is justffied. In other words, this market
failure may require  private market  regulation  to force provision, but may not necessarily  require  that the
government  should take on the task of providing  the full benefit. 2
An additional concern in the debate  over whether retirement  plans should be public or
private is  the worry that private  retirement  schemes  are intrinsically  unable  to protect  against  certain  types
of macroeconomic  risk. For example,  even when  private  capital markets  are well established,  the risk of
inflation  remains  one which is impossible  to insure  against  completely  in the pri iMte  market  (Bodie 1990;
Pesando  1991).  Hence  private  pensions  cannot  guarantee  constant  real  retirement  consumption  streams,
a failure  which seriously  undermines  confidence  in private  pension  benefit  systems,  and  thus is especially
troubling  In  countries  with high inflation  histories. Added  to this is the concem over  undiversifiable  capital
market  risk of other types,  which only  the national  govemment  can offer partial  protection  against. In the
U.S.  for example,  the capital  market  crash of  the 1930s  destroyed  both jobs and private  pension  savings,
and is often cited as a primary motivation  for publicly provided pensions. On the other hand, public
pension plans do not guarantee  constant  real benefit  values  either,  since recent  history shows  that  their
assets  and oftentimes  their benefit  payments  can be  subject  to fiscal  pressure  and  Dolitical  manipulation.
Thus the vaunted greater stability of public plans given macroeconomic  variation may be, in fact, not
much superior to that of private plans (Mitchell  and Smith  forthcoming).
Credible  long-term  real  pension  promises  do appear  to require  some form of govemment
intervention,  though the particular  form this takes varies  widely across countries.  One method which
stops short  of complete  govemment  takeover  of the system,  is to encourage  the creation  of private  plans
with some aovemment insurance  against macroeconomic  shocks.  Private  sector pension plans are
permitted to purchase real government-backed  securities in the U.K. and in Canada for example,  a32
practice  which  has been  hailed  as increasing  retirement  security  without  a fully nationalized  system
(Munnell  and Grolnic  1986). In the U.S.,  defined  benefit  pensions  offered  though  the private  sector  are
required to  participate  in a  govemment-run  mandatory  pension insurance  plan, which protects
beneficiaries  against  partial  loss  of benefits  in the eventuality  of company  bankruptcy  (Ippolito  1989).
Partial  govemment  insurance  for privately-run  pension  plans is also provided  in Chile,  though the
govemment  has  sought  to "privatize'  the national  social  security  retirement  plan  as a whole  (Diamond
1992;  Bodie  and Merton  1992;  Marcel  and  Arenas  1992;  Merton  and Bodie  1992).
Despite  the  appeal  of government  pension  insurance,  some  concems  should  be noted.
First  is the problem  that govemment  pension  insurance  is still  relatively  new,  and  the economic  features
of these  insurance  programs  have  yet to be fully  worked  out. Pricing  government  insurance  so as to
reflect  the true cost of coverage,  without  driving  private  plans  and/or the govemment  insurer  out of
business,  has  proven  elusive  and thus  far has  required  considerable  subsidies  from the public  sector
(Ippolito  1989;  Bodie  1992).  A related  problem  is  that govemment  guarantees  regarding  future  pension
promises  require  that  the public  be  confident  of long-term  political  and economic  stability.  Whether  and
to what  extent  retirement  systems  in developing  and  developed  countries  can  keep  the promises  made
to future  generations  despite  serious  demographic  pressures  is, as yet,  unknown.
In  addition  to market  failure  motivations  for  public  intervention  in  retirement  systems,  many
feel  that ecultv  considerations  are  an important  factor  explaining  why  both  public  and private  pensions
co-exist  in a multiple  pillar  retirement  system.  Public  social  security  programs  are  frequently  used  to
provide  guaranteed  income  floors  under  those  who  are  economically  vulnerable  and unable  to sustain
themselves  due  to infirmity,  lack  of  job skills,  or other  problems.  Minimum  income  insurance  is  often  seen
as  a govenmment  responsibility,  inasmuch  as  only  a govemment  can  exert  the  necessary  taxing  authority
to finance  widespread  income  support  programs.
It should  be emphasized,  however,  that  the redistributive  rationale  does  not necessarily
mandate  that  old-age  insurance  should  be  public.  Thus  in  some  countries,  most  notably  in parts  of  Africa
and  Asia,  older  persons  are  virtually  completely  privately  supported  by family  members,  by religious  and33
community groups, and/or charity (Deaton  and Paxson, 1992).  Also, there is at least  the potential for
private  purchase  of  insurance  by younger  workers,  against  likely  events  threatening  consumption  pattems
when they are old, such as nursing home insurance. (It should be noted that adverse selection  and
moral hazard problems  seem sufficiently  severe  that these instruments  have not developed  very widely
even In  the United States.) In any event,  the equity motivation  for old age benefit  plans requires  that  an
individual  or group identify  a living standard  against  which older peoples' resources  are compared,  and
provide a means to achieve  affordable  insurance. Policymakers  often disagree  over the proper equity
standard, making it difficult  to compare retirement  systems  in some cases. In addition it Is widely held
that young workers underestimate  their future needs,  either  as a result of poor information  or systematic
myopia,  and as a result should be forced to purchase  more insurance  for patemalistic  reasons."
Before leaving  the discussion  over public  versus private  provision of retirement  income,
it must be noted that retirement  systems  are often criticized  for two other reasons as well: because  of
administrative  inefficiencies,  and because  of inadequate  Integration. Administrative  inefficiencies  in public
systems  were recently  highlighted  in a study of several  Latin  American  public pension  funds; that report
concluded  that most public plans reported negative  rates  of return during the decade of the 1980s,  and
devoted excessive  funds to bureaucratic  management  (Mesa-Lago  1989, 1990). This problem is not
limited  to Latin  American  public plans; a recent  study of U.S. private  pensions  found that rates  of return
eamed  were  below market  rates  eamed by diversified  mutual  fund portfolios  (McCarthy  and Tumer  1989).
It has also been reported that record-keeping is problematic in many Eastem European and Latin
American  pension systems,  particularly  when they, lack modern computers  and computer software  to
keep track of contributions  and assets. 2"  Similar bookkeeping difficulties  in Eastem Europe make it
virtually impossible  to compute  govemmental  liability for long-term  benefit promises. This is obviously
a matter of much concem to the govemments and to  lending institutions, since retirement system
promises  are a form of national debt which affects a country's economic health. Data collection and
processing  problems  are not limited  to public plans;  indeed, computerized  record-keeping  and analysis
of privately  sponsored pensions has been possible  in only the last half decade in the United States.34
An administrative  problem  just beginning  to be  understood  in  the early  1990s  is the  fact
that in many  countries,  private  and public  sector  plans  affecting  retirement  are  often  not  well  integrated,
and sometimes  have  unforeseen  and complex  overlaps  between  the separate  components.  As noted
above,  many  European  nations  and some  others  as well  offer a diversity  of pathways  to retirement,
including  partial retirement,  flexible  retirement,  disability  and unemployment  coverage. These  are
generally  managed  through  distinct  agencies  which do not necessarily  communicate  and Integrate
benefits  in a coherent  form.  This generates  problems  of sometimes  unforeseen  overlaps  between
different  components  of the  many  plans,  and  makes  an  assessment  and  overhaul  of the  system  complex.
In addidon,  as the  International  labor  force  becomes  Increasing  mobile  with  trade  agreements  fashioned
In  Western  Europe  and  the  Americas,  lack  of  retirement  system  integration  will  create  barriers  to labor  that
may  become  increasingly  problematic.
In addiUton  to the other  rationales  offered  for public  versus  private  retirement  plans,  it
should  be noted  that  retirement  systems  are  not  simply  neutral  players  in  an economic  system.  Instead,
analysts  have  argued  that  they  can  have  quite  different  effects  in labor  and  capital  markets,  and  generate
sRillovers  with  vastly  different  consequences  for overall  economy-wide  equity  and efficiency.
C.  Economic  Effects  of Multiole-Pillar  Retirement  Systems
Many  questions  remain  about  the economic  effects  of retirement  systems  on labor  and
capital  markets,  though  some  conclusions  are  drawn  out in  this  section.  In  terms  of labor  market  effects,
there  is evidence  that early  retirement  incentives  contributed  to the  trend  toward  earlier  retirement  both
in the developed  countries,  and in some  developing  countries. This is because  relatively  generous
benefits  are  relatively  easier  to get,  and  because  employers  under  stress  have  found  high  payroll  tax  rates
a disincentive  to employment.  It is not yet known  whether  early  retirement  offerings  reduce  overall
unemployment  rates  and  open  up  job opportunities  for younger  workers  that otherwise  would  not have
developed,  though  there  Is  good  reason  to suspect  they  do not. Early  retirement  plans  are  an  expensive
long-term  subsidy  to relatively  young  persons,  which  in the long  run  will  require  imposing  higher  taxes.35
Most  likely,  less  expensive,  shorter-term  programs  with  fewer  work  disincentives  could  be designed  to
attack  unemployment,  while  reducing  Income  Insacurity  among  the poor.
In  terms  of capital  market  effects,  the  literature  suggests  that  underfunded  public  pension
systems  do not appear  to massively  depress  private  savings,  though  they certainly  do not seem  to
Increase  It.  Fully  funded  private  pensions  In the United  States  apparently  Increase  capital  formation
modestly,  though  it Is  not  clear  whether  this  positive  effect  carries  over  to developing  economies  with  less
extensive  capital  markets. It has also been alleged  that private  pension  plan growth  can generate
healthier  capital  markets,  though  pension  plans  in  the  developing  countries  examined  here  have  thus  far
fallen  short  of spurrlng  massive  new  private  savings.
Retirement  Systems'  Labor  Market  Effects
Retirement  systems  provide  old-age  Income,  and  some  might  think  that  their  main  labor
market  effects  would  therefore  be limited  to the  end of the  worklfe. Indeed,  retirement  plans  do exert  a
powerful  effect  on  workers'  choice  of retirement  age. In addition,  however,  retirement  systems  affect  a
myriad  of labor  supply  decisions  made  by  younger  and middle-aged  workers  as well,  depending  on  the
way  the benefit  formulas  are structured,  and  also depending  on the  way  benefits  are  financed.  Effects
of  retirement  systems on labor demand are also important and varied.  In  the case of  a
voluntarily-supplied  company  pension  plan, the retirement  promise  is an integral  part of the firm's
compensation  package;  hence  pension  financing  and  benefit  formulas  are  endogenously  determined  with
labor  demand,  and not  external  to it. Governmental  social  security  systems  also  have  important  effects
on labor  demand,  especially  when  they  cover  only portions  of the workplace,  are  supported  by payroll
taxes  making  covered  workers  relatively  expensive,  and when  they offer benefits  which  favor early
retirement.  These  effects  are  sketched  in this review  of how  retirement  systems  affect  labor  markets.
Retirement  Systems  and  Labor  SuRDlV:  A great  deal  of microeconomic  research  during  the
1980s examined  the effects  of retirement  systems  on retirement  behavior. 28  Specifically,  studies  have
shown  that  workers  with  generous  pensions  retire  earlier  than  those  with  lower  pension  benefits.  Also,36
workers  offered  more  money  to delay  retirement  tend  to do so.  In both  cases,  these  responses  are
statistically  significant,  but small.  For  example  In  the United  States,  a 10  percent  increase  in  the present
value  of total  retirement  income  at age  60  has  been  found  to induce  earlier  retirement  by only  about  1-2
months,  and  a 10  percent  Income  increase  for deferring  retirement  Induces  later  retirement  by 1-4  months
(Fields  and Mitchell  1984a).2" What  this Implies  is that the generous  early  retirement  benefits  made
available  throughout  most  of the  developed  countries  during  the  decade  of the 1980s  contributed  to the
declining  labor  supply  of older workers,  though  they probably  do not explain  the entire downward
trend.'  One  phenomenon  which  deserves  more  research  In the next  decade  Is  how  uncertainty  affects
retirement  patterns. For instance  when  inflation  threatens  a benefit  promise,  or when  plans  become
unstable  due to underfunding,  retirement  behavior  is forced  to adapt and retirement  dates  must be
readjusted.  Too little  is known  about  these  causes  and  consequences  of such  adaptations,  and more
research  on these  reactions  is needed.
Retirement  systems  influence  not only older  workers'  labor  supply;  they  also influence
labor supply  by younger  employees  as well.  One effect  is a deterrent  to mobility,  which may be
explained  by pension  plan  rules  requiring  long  service  before  vesting,  plans'  failing  to protect  against
Inflation  the  benefits  of  job-leavers,  and in  the  case  of defined  benefit  plans,  formulas  which  defer  benefit
accruals  until  late  In  an  employee's  worklife.  The  facts  are  clear:  workers  with  employer-supplied  private
pensions  change  jobs only half  as often  as workers  without  pensions. 3'  Whether  reduced  turnover  is
deemed  socially  desirable  depends  on  whether  more  stable  employees  are  more  productive,  and there
is some  suggestion  that they  may  be.32
Young  and middle  aged  workers'  behavior  may  be  influenced  by retirement  system  rules
In other  ways  as well, because  of complex  benefit  accrual  pattems. Thus in the United  States for
instance,  earnings  below  a ceiling  are  credited  toward  the  social  security  pension,  and  hence  are  subject
to payroll  tax,  but earnings  above  this  are  neither  credited  toward  benefits,  nor  taxed. This  tax  system
is combined  with a redistributive  benefit  formula,  so that highly-paid  workers  have  an Incentive  to
concentrate  work and eamings  during  narrower  segments  of the worklife,  so as to reduce  their  tax37
burden,  than  would  be true  otherwise.  As yet there  has  been  little  research  on the question  of whether
workers  fully  understand  complex  retirement  system  rules,  and how  flexibly  they  can  reallocate  work  so
as to maximize  net pension  retums  over  their  lifetimes,  as well  as toward  the end of the  worklife.33  This
too remains  a topic  for additional  research.
Retirement  Systems  and  Labor  Demand:  Studies  of retirement  systems  recognize  that  such
systems  can  influence  the demand  for labor  in important  ways.  The  negative  effect  of high  payroll  taxes
on labor  demand  Is  a concem  in many  nations. Payroll  tax rates  for public  pensions  in Latin  America
range  from over  50 percent  of the wage  base  in Brazil,  and 28 percent  Paraguay.  Payroll  tax rates  of
50 percent  are not uncommon  in the Eastem  Eueopean  and former  Soviet  nations,  while  France  and
Germany  impose  rates  closer  to 20  percent  for  their  public  plans  (U.S.  Department  of Health  and  Human
Services  1990;  Atkins  1991). Rates  such  as these  added  to labor  costs  depress  the demand  for labor,
which  in tum reduces  wages  and employment.  In addition,  to the  extent  that payroll  taxes  are  seen  as
fixed  costs of employment,  firms  hire  fewer  workers,  each of whom  works  longer  hours, rather  than
spreading  the now-smaller  overall  employment  across  more  employees.
Many  economic  studies  have  sought  to pinpoint  the precise  magnitude  of these  payroll
tax  effects  on  labor  market  outcomes,  with  mixed  results  due  to data  constraints  (Dilnot  1991;  Hamermesh
1993;  Hart  1984).  Theoretical  models  indicate  that  payroll  taxes  affect  wages  and  employment  depending
on how  flexibly  labor  is supplied  to the market,  and on employers'  labor  demand  elasticities.  While  no
single  set of empirical  results  is commonly  accepted,  Hamermesh  (1993)  suggests  that in developed
countries,  the burden  of the payroll  tax falls primarily  and almost  completely  on labor, rather  than
consumers  or producers.  Specifically,  higher  payroll  taxes  are  apparently  fully  translated  into reduced
wages,  with  relatively  little  disemployment  effect,  among  adult  male  manufacturing  full-time  workers  In
Industrialized  economies  where  payroll  tax coverage  is virtually  universal.
In the nonindustrialized  countries,  lack  of data  and special  labor  market  features  have
made  i difficult  for researchers  to produce  useful  estimates  of the effects  of retirement  systems'  payroll
tax.34  Depending  on the country,  workers  may  have  options  outside  of the  economic  sector  subject  to38
payroll  taxes,  labor  demand  elastcities  may  vary  greatly  across  sectors,  and minimum  wage  laws  may
restrict  wage  declines.  Each  of these  factors  makes  it far more  complex  to estimate  payroll  tax effects.
For  example,  In  some  developing  countries,  the  existence  of an  informal  and/or  rural  labor  market  permits
workers  escaping  the taxed  sector  to find employment,  albeit  at lower  pay.  This can mitigate  the
disemployment  effect  produced  by the  payroll  tax  In  the covered  sector,  but may  also  increase  eamings
inequality.  In many  developing  countries  there  Is  also widespread  tax evasior,  an Institutional  reality
which  is likely  to carry  over  to some  of the economies  In  transitlon  as well. For Instance,  in Argentina,
where  the social  security  tax rate  is 50 percent,  one-third  of tax  revenue  Is  apparently  not  collected;  this
finding  lec:  McGreevey  (1990)  to suggest  that  social  security  revenues  might  actually  increase  if the  payroll
tax  rate  were  lowered.  Alternatively,  if retirement  systems  were  financed  by  more  general  revenue  Instead
of payroll  taxes,  there  could  be  fewer  negative  labor  market  consequences  for employment  and  wages.
More  research  is urgently  needed  on the consequences  of payroll  taxes  for wages  and employment  in
the developing  country  context.
Other  ways  in  which  national  retirement  systems  shape  the  demand  for labor  should  also
be  mentioned.  Firms'  compensation  and  pension  offerings  are  thought  to be responsive  to govemment
labor  market  and tax policy,  as well  as govemment-sponsored  retirement  benefits.  Higher  and more
secure  benefit  promises  from public  plans  permit  employers  to worry  less  about  company-sponsored
retirement  saving,  which  offers  additional  latftude  within  which  pay  packages  can be  designed. Hence
changes  in tax and retirement  policy  can  have  direct  and potent  effects  on worker  pay,  tumover  and
retirement  pattems,  and productivity  more  generally.  It is fair  to say  that these  effects  have  not  been  the
subject  of sufficient  study,  and are a vital  research  need  in the decade  to come  (Gustman  and others
1992).
Retirement  Systems,  UnemRlovment.  and Income  Security:  It Is widely  contended  that
early retirement  benefits  in the developed  countries  devised  during  the 1980s  are a response  to a
persistent  unemployment  problem.  As  one  viewer  put  it,  "those  who  fear  unemployment  (especially  youth
unemployment...)  argue for a  consciously  oriented  'exchange  of  the generations'  in the labor39
market...[which]  is both legally  and socially  more  acceptable  and cheaper  than Introducing  a decent
scheme  of unemployment  benefits'  (Szalai  1992). A natural  follow-up  question  is whether  In fact  the
policy  shift  toward  earlier  retirement  reduced  unemployment  rates,  and  whether  ft  was more  acceptable,
and cheaper,  than  various  policy  alternatives.
No satisfactory  answer  to this  fundamentally  Important  policy  question  yet exists,  and it
should  be high priority  to undertake  this research.  Inttial  explorations  demonstrate  that It is difficult  to
compare  unemployment  definitions,  and early retirement  programs,  across  nations. In Britain,  for
example,  when  older men  receiving  unemployment  payments  were  no longer  required  to register  as
unemployed,  official  unemployment  rates  dropped  by half,  from 19.7  percent  in 1982,  to 9.6  percent  In
1983  (Laczko  and  Phillipson  1991).  A similar  result  prevailed  in  West  Germany,  after  persons  age  58  and
older  were  no longer  required  to register  in order  to receive  unemployment  subsidies.  Certainly  it can
be said that these early retirement  schemes  were "successful"  in reducing  unemployment,  but by
redefining  unemployment  rather  than  by raising  employment  levels.  In other  countries,  older  workers  in
training  programs  or  in  sheltered  employment  are  variously  included  or excluded  from  the  unemployment
count,  which  in  turn affects  estimated  official  unemployment  rates  (Piachaud  1986).
The  key  issue  is clearly  not  how  to design  early  retiremer,t  plans  which  through  definition
changes  reduce  official  unemployment  rates. Rather,  the  important  question  is whether  early  retirement
plans  adopted  during  the 1980s  ultimately  produced  healthier  labor  markets  and  more  growth  than  would
have  occurred  otherwise,  while  easing  the  transition  process.
In order  to answer  this  query,  it is necessary  to formulate  a counterfactual,  characterizing
what  would  have  happened  if the early  retirement  offerings  had not  been  implemented.  Job markets  in
the early  1980s  were  not particularly  strong  for any  age groups  In most  countries,  and older  persons
suffered  from  relatively  high  unemployment  rates  as  well  as longer  spells  of unemployment.  Since  most
unemployed  older people  tend to move  out of the labor  force rather  than seek new  jobs, the early
retirement  benefits  probably  provided  an income  cushion  for many  persons  who  were  on  their  way  out
of the work world anyway. Clearly  many  of the older unemployed  had little chance  of becoming40
re-employed;  in Great  Britaln,  for example,  only  60  percent  of women  age  50.59  receMng  unemployment
benefits  actually  sought  jobs (Laczko  and Phillipson  1991;  OECD  1990).
Before  taking  this  as  evidence  that  the  programs  succeeded,  one  must  ask  whether  older
workers  such  as  these  might  have  reentered  the  labor  force  without  the  early-out  benefits,  and what  the
economic  consequences  of offering  the benefits  were. Surprisingly  litle research  has explored  this
question. Layard  and others  (1991:  566) compare  unemployment  trends  and the growth of early
retirement  across  many  developed  nations,  and  conclude  that  'he countries  that  have  experienced  more
early retirement  (often encouraged  by govemment  policy) are those with the biggest rise in
unemployment."  The  direction  of the causal  relationship  was  not explored  in that study. Certainly  this
question  should  be  a high priority  research  topic  for policymakers  in the retirement  arena.
One  topic  that  no  one  has  devoted  much  attention  to is  the  question  of whether  continued
work  might  have  been  an option  for many  early  retirees,  since  they  were  quite  young  (many  in  their  50s)
and probably  in no worse  health  than  previous  generations  which  worked  far longer. Had  this cohort
remained  In the labor  force,  it might  have  exerted  downward  pressure  on wages  by swelling  the ranks
of those seeking  jobs.  To the extent  that wage rigidity  has been identified  as a major cause of
unemployment,  it is  at least  possible  that  early  retirement  schemes  could  have  actually  raised  rather  than
lowered  overall  joblessness,  by permitting  high  end  rigid  wages  to remain  in  effect  longer.  Indeed  in  West
Germany,  older  women's  and men's  unemployment  rates  were  three  to five  times  higher  in 1989,  as
compared  to 1977.36  What  they  would  have  been  without  the programs  is uncertain.
A related  question  Is whether  younaer  workers'  labor  market  options  would  have  been
markedly  worse,  had the early  retirement  options  not been  in effect. More  evidence  on this point is
needed,  but  there  Is  reason  for skepticism.  An  early-out  policy  which  reduces  the  supply  of older  workers
can  Improve  demand  for younger  workers  only  when  the  two age groups  are  substitutes  in production,
and this has  not been  demonstrated.  A study  of substitution  between  different  age  groups  of workers
using  data  from  the United  States  concluded  that 1)  within  a given  gender  group,  workers  from different
age  groups  are  complementary  (with  the  exception  of teenagers);  and  2) most  substitution  occurs  across41
gender  for dfflerent  age categories  (Levine  and Mitchell  1988). While  other  approaches  to measuring
substitution  should be Investigated  with data for more countries,  there is certainly  no a priori reason  to
expect  that forcing  workers  in their  50s  to retire  automatically  opens  up job possibiliies  for younger
employees.  In addition,  of course,  If one recognizes  that early  retirement  plans  increase  current  and
future  tax burdens  on younger  workers,  there  is no clear-cut  presumption  that early-out  programs  are
cheaper  in  the  long  run  than  the  alternative.  Indeed  i is at least  plausiblethat  shorter  term  commftments
to persons  in  their  50s  would  have  been  less  expensive,  given  that early  retirement  pensions  frequently
entail  huge  subsidies  which  must  be met by higher  future  taxes.
It is  also  important  to address  the  question  of whether  retirement  systems  reduce  old-age
income  Insecurity,  particularly  in difficult  economic  times. Of  course,  answers  vary  from  one country  to
the next,  depending  on actual  coverage  rates  of the working  population  (e.g.  in Honduras  less  than  20
percent  of the population  has social  security  coverage,  whereas  in many  Western  European  nations
coverage  is virtually  universal),  what  types  of benefits  are  provided  (e.g.  whether  be !efits  are  mainly  of
the  flat type,  or whether  benefits  more  insurance-oriented  by being  tied  to preretirement  pay),  and  other
institutional  features  of the  benefits  including  whether  they  are  indexed.  Social  security  systems  the  world
over  have  the potential  to reduce  poverty,  and many  have  done  quite  well  (see  Andrews  1990;  Mitchell
1992;  Pestieau  1991;  and  Young  1991  among  others). On the other  hand,  some  appear  to be biased
against  the poor,  as noted  by  Grosh  (1990),  who  concluded  that  pension  and  disability  programs  in Latin
America  favor  the more  highly  paid primary  sector  workem,  after  accounting  for both  taxes  paid and
benefits  received.  In addition,  early  retirees  also  tend  to more  heavily  subsidized  than  most,  since  they
pay  Into  the  system  for a much  shorter  period  yet  live  longer,  all  the  while  receiving  benefits  which  exceed
the  amounts  they  would  have  received  at the regular  retirement  date. Too,  as McGreevey  (1990)  adds,
the elderly  are  not of necessity  those  who most  require  income  supplementation.
For  these  reasons,  serlous  questions  remain  about  how  effectively  early  retirement  plans
were  in shielding  from  poverty  older  persons  at risk  of low income  during  the decade  of the 1980s,  and
how  target-efficient  the systems  were  in concentrating  limited  funds  on  the most  needy. Of even  more42
policy  concern  is the  question  of how  vulnerable  future  generations  of retirees  will  be  to future  retirement
benefit  cuts. Many  eminent  analysts  have  expressed  profound  concem  about  the likelihood  of such
retirement  system  benefit  reductions,  based  primarily  on their  gloomy  assessment  of anticipated  fiscal
pressures  paired  with  the rapid  growth  of the  aging  population  (Marchand  and Pestieau  1991).  It will  be
critically  important  to track,  and  correct  where  possible,  changes  in retirement  systems  which  force  older
persons  into  poverty. This  Is  a high  priority  research  need  In  the next  decade.
Capital  Market  Effects  of Retirement  Systems
Analysts  concemed  with  the effects  of retirement  systems  on capital  markets  generally
ask  whether  retirement  programs  increase  savings,  and  H  so,  whether  these  retirement  plans  can  be  used
to generate  new  capital  for growth.
Many  authors  have  argued  over  the years  that public  retirement  systems,  particularly
unfunded  ones,  "crowd  our and thereby  reduce,  private  saving.3"  This  pessimistic  assessment  rests
on  the  argument  that  social  security  promises  replace  saving  that people  would  otherwise  engage  in on
their  own,  to protect  against  the possibility  of old-age  poverty. Particularly  when  an unfunded  social
security  system  is first started,  benefits  are  granted  to older  persons  in excess  of their  contributions.
Hence  the  transition  generations  receive  subsidies  from  future  cohorts  and  accordingly  have  the  incentive
to save  less  privately,  to offset  their  greater  wealth  offered  through  the public  plan. Opponents  of the
thesis  have  argued  that social  security  payments  will not alter  savings,  since  publicly-supplied  benefits
simply  substitute  for intergenerational  transfers  that would  have  occurred  via private  conduits. These
contradictory  views  of the predicted  effects  of public  pension  systems,  and others  Involving  possible
rearrangement  of work effort  over  the Idetime,  Imply  that there is no a priori  theoretical  relationship
between  public  pensions  and private  savings  levels.
Because  theory  is  ambiguous,  empirical  evidence  is  required  on  whether  public  retirement
plans  reduce  savings,  in  practice.  Some  authors  do  find  negative  effects,  but  many  others  conclude  with
Kotlikoff  that "the findings  lend lIttle  support  to the notion  that social  security  has  reduced  the capital43
stockl (Kotllkoff  1979:  409). Certainly  there  is no conclusive  evidence  that public  benefits  trade  off
one-for-one  with  private  savings  In developed  countries,  nor  is  there  any  apparent  positive  effect  of public
plans  on savings. 37 There  is very  little  evidence  on this point  from  developing  countries.
Tuming  to the  question  of whether  private  pensions  affect  savings,  again  theory  offers  little
clear evidence. For Instance,  If fully  funded  private  pensions  are perfect  substitutes  for nonpension
private  saving,  monies  Invested  in  these  pensions  would  offset  nonpension  saving  one-for-one.  However,
some  workers  covered  by pension  plans  are  likely  to save  more  than  they  would  have  otherwise,  due  to
myopia  or Inadequate  Information;  In this  Instance,  pensions  could  increase  savings. Tax  preferences
In many  countries  also  alter  the  terms  of trade  between  pension  and other  savings  Instruments,  making
i clear  that net  effects  will depend  on specific  institutional  structures  in each  country.  Adding  leavening
to this discussion  is the recent  suggestion  that capital  markets  may be quite local in nature,  so that
commercial  loans  are  sensibly  provided  by locally-operated,  well-informed  financial  organizations.  (This
was  concluded  In the United  States,  though  studies  elsewhere  remain  to be conducted;  see  Hannan
1991). Perhaps  private  pension  fund capital  can  beneficially  add to supplies  of local  capital,  and take
advantage  of Investment  opportunities,  that otherwise  would  not be  noted  by outside  investors.
Empirical  studies  on private  pensions  are  modestly  optimistic,  though  here  too there  are
a variety  of estimates  (Munnell  and  Yohn  1992).  In the United  States,  analysts  tend  to find  that another
dollar  of private  penslon  benets reduces  nonpension  private  savings  by  70  cents;  on net  then,  additional
private  penslon  wealth  appears  to increase  capital  formation,  by 30 cents  on the dollar. It is not yet
known  if this  small  positive  effect  carries  over  to other  countries,  particularly  developing  economies  with
much  less  extensive  capital  markets.
Irrespective  of whether  new  capital  is generated,  it is still  possible  that private  pensions
can  channel  existing  savings  to promote  equiy and bond  markets  often  absent  in developing  countries,
and for this reason  policymakers  sometimes  favor private  over public  pensions. Unfortunately  this
preference  begs the question  of whether  developing  countries  lack funds  for truly worthwhile  private
Investments  which  somehow  intemational  investors  fail  to perceive,  or  whether  capital  markets  are  absent44
because  domestic  projects  are  insufficiently  attractive  to compete  for available  funds  on  the international
capital  market  (Zollner  1991).
In any event,  private  savings  plans  can  alter  the composition  of national  savings  if they
change  savers'  asset  risk/return  portfolios.  In Poland,  for example,  pensions  have  been  nominated  to
hold commercial  paper  generated  by newiy-privatized  firms. Clearly,  forcing  pensions  to concentrate
investments  in domestic  firms  of questionable  profitability  imposes  nondiversMed  risks  on pensioners'
shoulders,  with  the possibility  of high (or no)  retum. This  pension  portfolio  differs  substantially  from  a
diverse  set of intemational  holdings  hedged  against  regional  risk,  exchange  rate  and inflation  risk,  and
other  more  local  concems  (Diamond  1992;  Bodie  and Merton  1992;  and Boswell  and Granato  1992).  It
is unlikely  that workers  will  feel  as secure  about  these  plans  as they  would  about  their previous  claims
against  public  retirement  plan benefits.  Another  case  in point  is the Chilean  system,  seen  by many  as
the  most  successful  reform  in  this  regard,  since  the  underfunded  social  security  system  was  replaced  by
a mandatory  private  defined  contribution  plan system. To date  however,  it is not clear  that that this
changeover  will  produce  net  new  domestic  private  savings,  because  pension  holdings  until  recently  have
been  restricted  mainly  to govemment  debt.
In sum, in the early  stages  of economic  transformation,  private  pension  plan asset
composition  may  differ  little  from  that  of public  plans,  and  consequently  may  have  little  immediate  positive
effects  on  capital  markets. In  the  longer  run,  perhaps,  pensions  can  certainly  participate  in  capital  market
growth.  The  evidence  suggests,  however,  that  private  pension  plans  may  not be  the "engine  of growth"
desired  by many,  though  they may  contribute  modestly.
D. Lessons  and Research  Needs
Many  nations  have  expensive  and  complex  multiple  pillarretirement  programs.  The  need
to provide  income  security  in old age  will  continue  to grow  In years  to come  - workers  in many  nations
have  grown  accustomed  to increasingly  early  retirement,  the aging  population  is expanding,  longevity
continues  to increase  in  most  countries,  and  the  family  Is  no  longer  a primary  source  of old-age  support.45
At the same  time,  many  countries  confront  Impending  crises  In their  public  retirement  plans  since  they
face  dwindling  tax bases  due to recession,  labor  force  shrinkage,  and industrial  restructuring,  and are
reluctant  to increase  already-high  payroll  tax rates. During  the 1990s  the challenge  will be to redesign
multiple-pillar  retirement  systems  to as to ensure  continued  old-age  economic  security,  while  reducing
the depressive  effects  of retirement  systems  on labor  and capitl markets.
Retirement  systems  are commanding  Increasing  attention  from development  analysts
seeking  to restructure  country  economies  with an eye  toward  growth. Policy  analysts  Interested  in
integrating  retirement  system  reform  with  other  aspects  of country  fiscal  and  financial  reform  should  be
aware  of the following  guidelines  and lessons.
Guidellnes  and Lessons
Developing  and developed  countries  are increasingly  tuming  to two-tier  benefit  plans.
Often  the  first  tier  is  formulated  to deliver  a minimum  welfare  benefit,  sometimes  means  tested  and  funded
out of general  revenue.  A second  tier  is usually  geared  toward  replacing  a portion  of pre-retirement  pay,
and may  be privately  financed  (though  often  some  form  of govemment  insurance  is offered). Cleaner
separation  of the  two  tiers  may  become  increasingly  important  for better-targeted  social  safety  net  poverty
reduction  programs.
Many  developing  economies  have  not  formally  valued,  nor  recognized,  retirement  system
promises.  Development  agencies  can  help  devise  methods  of measuring  these  long-term  debts,  in  order
to determine  how  these  will affect  long  term economic  planning  and growth.
Govemments  are only beginning  to recognize  that high payroll  taxes  as a means  of
financing  retirement  benefits  have  undesirable  efficiency  and equity  consequences.  This  is particularly
a problem  when these benefits  favor relatively  well-off  young retirees,  and when tax evasion  is
widespread.
There  Is no evidence  that the Westem  economies  are better off by having  heavily
subsidized  retirement  for workers  in  their  50s. Furthermore,  generous  early  retirement  benefits  promised46
in the last  decade  will  carry  large  and long-term  costs. An emerging  lesson  is that retirement  systems
are not well-suited  to solve  unemployment  problems.
Many  developing  countries  need  to computerize  retirement  system  data  on workers  and
retirees.  Systems  are  also  required  to computerize  financial  data,  track  fund  Inflows,  outflows,  investment
retums,  and so forth. Development  agencies  can  help  with  this  task,  installing  computers  and creating
software  to track  eamings  and payroll  taxes  paid,  as well  as benefit  eligibility  and benefit  payouts,  along
the way  offering  technical  assistance  on  accounting  and administrative  efficiency  standards.
Many industrializing  economies  are in need of improved  financial  systems  which
development  agencies  are in the process  of providing. It will be important  to incorporate  retirement
system  reforms  in the  course  of formulating  technical  assistance  plans,  since  in many  cases  a perceived
need  for private  pension  plans  will interact  with  capital  market  development  strategies.
Along  with assistance  establishing  better  financial  systems,  developing  countries  are
finding  it necessary  to codify  law  and property  rights  so as  to clarify  conditions  of capital  ownership.  It
is crucial  to include  retirement  savings  instruments  in the process,  so that individuals,  companies,  and
the government  will better understand  the risk/retum  characteristics  of different  retirement  savings
components.
Research  Needs
A fundamental  obstacle  to better  retirement  policy  is the lack  of data  on the economic
effects  of retirement  systems  on labor  and capitil markets.  Greatly  needed  in the developing  countries
are household  living  surveys  indicating  the economic  activity  and well-being  of workers  and retired
persons. Perhaps  even  more  critical  is the need  for employer-side  surveys  which  can illustrate  how
retirement  system  taxes  and benefits  affect  labor  demand.  Sample  surveys  will  probably  be required  to
fill both objectives. Finally,  but  equally  important,  better  databases  should be developed  on the
institutional  features  of and interactions  within  multiple-pillar  retirement  systems,  and the ways  in  which
the private  and public  systems  interact. Information  of this type  will be of great  help  to policymakers47
setting the agenda for retirement  system reform In  the next century.
Research  subjects  deserving  of particular  attention  from retirement  program analysts  In
the decade to come include the following:
1.  How do the Institutional  components of retirement  systems  work? Better
information  is required  on the complex multiple-pillar  systems  shaping retirement
behavior  around  the world, Including  data on tax evasion, public and private  plan
benefit integration,  and resulting  Income distribution  outcomes.
2.  How do older workers  respond  to the incentives  embedded  in retirement  systems?
Better  data are required  to evaluate  behavioral  responses  to benefit instability  due
to uncertainty,  Inflation,  underfunding,  and political instability. Also more research
is required  on worker  understanding  of retirement  system  rules. Are early  retirement
subsidies  more acceptable,  and cheaper,  than other policy alternatives  -- especially
with the tax burden is recognized?
3.  How does the demand for labor respond  to retirement  system provisions? Better
data are needed  to devise improved  models of labor demand, which take into
account retirement  options  and payroll  taxes. In particular,  it will  be useful  to obtain
measures  of labor demand  elasticities  for developing  countries,  taking  into account
covered and uncovered  sections,  minimum  wages,  and other institutional  realities.
4.  How do the retirement  systems  themselves  respond  to political,  demographic,  and
economic pressure? Under what  circumstances  can they keep, or will  they break,
promises  made  to current  and  future retirees?  How do specific  benefit  offerings  alter
old-age economic insecurity  and overall income redistribution?
5.  When can private retirement  systems  have desirable  effects  on savings
and investment  in developing  countries  with incipient  capital markets?
This requires  asking whether developing  countries  lack funds for truly
worthwhile  private investments  which somehow intemational  investors  fail48
to perceive,  or whether  capital  markets  are  absent  because  domestic
projects  are insufficlently  attractive  to compete  for available  funds  on the
intemational  capital  market.
As  the  deve;oped  and  developing  nations  move  into  the  next  century,  some  countries  may
not  be  able  to maintain  retirement  promises  made  to older  persons.  It  will  become  increasingly  expensive
to maintain  systems  which  provide  relatively  young  workers  strong  Incentives  to retire  early.  either  through
regular  early retirement  benefits,  or a variety  of other early-out  pathways  including  disability  and
unemployment  benefit  options.  Given  these predictable  fiscal stresses,  it seems  prudent  to begin
discussion  of alternative  approaches  to retirement  system  overhaul.  Such  discussions  may  Indicate  w;  .ich
sequence  of policy  changes  in  taxes  and benefits  over  time  can  best  smooth  labor  and capital  market
adjustments.  A deliberate  approach  surely  seems  more  sensible  than  the alternative  of doing  nothing
now,  and  then  being  forced  to impose  massive  benefit  cuts  when  the  aging  workforce  retires.  Even  with
this  tack,  however,  the  fiscal  problems  confronting  some  retirement  systems  are  so immediate  that  they
will require  more  immediate  attention.
What  are  the  hallmarks  of retirement  systems  that  work  well?  It  seems  clear  that  a healthy
retirement  system  would  be  judged  as efficient,  fair,  and  fiscally  sound. And most  policymakers  would
agree  that poorly  functioning  retirement  systems  are  those  plagued  by  inefficiency  and  fraud,  with  inequity
in the distribution  of benefits  and  taxes,  and fiscally  unsound,  possibly  on the verge  on financial  ruin.
Unfortunately  the real  world  offers  many  examples  of poorly  functioning  retirement  systems,  and few  i
any  represent  a "gold standard". Nevertheless,  specifying  reform  goals  is helpful  in order  to determine
what  is likely  to be  beneficial,  and  what  Is  not. Using  high-cost  long-term  retirement  systems  to mitigate
short- and medium-term  unemployment  problems  will prove costly  and inefficient  as a solution  to
problems  faced  by economies  in  transition.49
ENDNOTES
1.  The 24 OECD  nations  are Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,
Germany,  Greece,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Luxembourg,  Netheriands,  NewZealand,  Norway,
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Turkey,  United  Kingdom,  and the United  States.
2.  For  a discussion  of different  definitions  of retirement  see  Fields  and  Mitchell  (1984b).  There  is
relatively  little  research  on the nature  of older  persons'  labor  force  flows;  for an examination  of
United  States  data  see  Quinn  and others  (1990).
3.  Whether  this  long-term  downward  pattern  in work  at older  ages  will persist  throughout  the next
several  decades  Is unknown.  There  is emergent  evidence  that in the  latter  half  of the 1980s  the
downward  participation  trend  stabilized  and In some  cases  even  slightly  reversed  itself  in a few
nations. See  OECD  (1991).  In  the United  States,  for instance,  labor  force  participation  rates  for
mean  age 60-64  In 1966  were  78%,  they  dropped  to 54%  In 1988,  and then  rose  to 55.5%  In
1990. For  men  age  65+, the male  LFPR  rate  in 1966  was  27%,  which  fell  to 15.8%  by 1985  and
then  rose  to 16.4%  by 1990  (unpublished  data  provided  by the US  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics).
Nevertheless,  it is premature  to determine  whether  this  trend  reflects  business  cycle  conditions,
whether  it resulted  from  curtailed  early  retirement  policies,  or whether  it is part  of a new  long-run
secular  trend.
4.  See  Szalal  (1991).  Without  discounting  that  evidence  on  dffferential  life  expectancies  In Hungary,
it should  be noted  that  the  availability  of disability  and sickness  benefits  probably  does  increase
the incidence  of reporting  of illness,  and reduces  labor  force  participation  rates,  in at least  some
countries.  For  example  Burkhauser  (1993)  points  out that high  disability  benefits  and relatively
lenient  qualification  standards  contribute  to low work  rates  in Germany  and the Netherlands.
5  . For  instance,  in the  United  States,  25  percent  of early  retirees  and 12  percent  of all retirees  cited
poor health  as their reason  for retirement  (Fields  and Mitchell  1984b). Less  information  is
available  from  other  countries,  though  there  may  be  somewhat  greater  age  discrimination  (Kohli
and others  1991).
6.  See  Mitchell  (1988a)  for evidence  on accident  pattems  by age in  the United  States;  there  is no
Information  on age profiles  of job-related  illness. The  data  show  that worker over  age 65 are
slightly  more  likely  to become  fatally  injured  on the  job than  workers  at younger  ages.
7.  On morbidity  trends  see  Baily  (1987).  More  research  is needed  on this  topic  in other  countries
as well.
8.  In the United  States,  the government  first  prohibited  firms  from  imposing  mandatory  retirement
before  age  65,  then  raised  it to age  70,  and  eventually  prohibited  mandatory  retirement  in  virtually
all occupations. Most private  sector employers  are now prevented  from using mandatory
retirement;  exempted  groups  are  generally  in  the public  sector  and  include  judges,  police,  pilots,
and firefighters.  For a discussion  of mandatory  retirement  policy,  see  Quinn  et al. (1990)  and
Gustman  and others  (1992).
9.  For instance,  a survey  of United  States  retirees  by the Commonwealth  Fund  (1990)  found  that
many  claimed  they  were  interested  in employment.50
10.  Hutchens  (1993)  found  that more  than  one quarier  of workers  aged 50  to 59 had no job after
displacement,  compared  to about 16  percent  for younger  workers. More  older  persons  also
dropped  out of the labor  force  or were  unemployed  as compared  to younger  employees  (about
35  percent  versus  around  25  percent).
11.  Levine  and Mitchell  (1988)  explored  this question  using data  from the United  States. More
cross-national  evidence  on the question  would  be useful.
12.  The material  in this paragraph  is developed  In more  detail  in Fields  and Mitchell  (1984b).  The
economic  effects  of pensions  described  here  apply  primarily  to men;  women's  responses  are
apparently  weaker.  See  Pozzebon  and Mitchell  (1989).
13.  For a discussion  of actuarial  reduction  factors  see  McGill  and Grubbs  (1989). Figures  given  In
the  text  are illustrative  only,  since  life  expectancy  tables  and discount  rates  must  be  specifically
tailored  to each  population  to determine  actuarial  neutrality.
14.  For  a discussion  of integration  between  public  and private  plans  In  the  United  States  see  Mitchell
(1992). A nice discussion  of selected  OECD  countries'  experiences  is available  in Dilnot  and
Walker  (1989),  KohIl  and others  (1991)  and  Schmahl  (1989).  Pension  plan  features  are  reviewed
in Dailey  and Turner  (forthcoming),  Turner  and Beller  (1992),  and Tumer  and Dailey  (1991).
15.  The  average  "baby  boomer"  will attain  age  65 in the  year  2011  in  the United  States.  The  timing
of this  pattem  will  differ  a great  deal  across  countries,  however,  since  the  baby  boom  lasted  only
three  years  in Japan,  as compared  to 15 years  in the U.S. As a consequence,  Japan  will
experience  more rapid population  aging than will the US and most other  Western  nations.
Developing  counties  are  typically  younger,  with  the  median  age  of the  population  likely  to remain
ten years  younger  (around  age 30 by the year 2025)  as compared  to their more  developed
counterparts  (around  age 40). See  Clark  (1991,  1993). Projecting  future  labor  force  trends  is
complex,  and is likely  to be an area  for fruitful  future  research. Levine  (1993)  discusses  the
United States  experience. For information  on other countries  see Esping-Andersen  and
Sonnnberger  (1991),  Pampel  and Weiss  (1983),  and Zweim0ller  (1991).
16.  Space constraints  restrict our discussion  to  retirement  programs,  to  the exclusion  of
unemployment  compensation,  health  and poverty  benefit  systems. Surveys  of other social
insurance  systems  areavailablein  Atkinson  (1987,1989,1991),  Atkinson  and  Mickelwright  (1991),
Hamermesh  (this  volume),  Holzmann  (1991),  and OECD  (1991),  among  others.
17.  It should  be noted  that most  OECD  nations,  and many  of the economies  in  transition,  also  have
special  and  distinct  retirement  systems  for special  groups  of workers  including  the  military,  public
employees,  miners,  railway  workers,  and  so  forth. Depending  on  the  country,  these  special  plans
can offer  much  more  generous  beneftts  than  the schemes  covering  regular  employees,  and In
many  cases  impose  large  and growing  burdens  on public  budgets. A complete  discussion  of
these  special  programs  is, however,  beyond  the purview  of this paper.
18.  The  relative  Importance  of the  extended  family  In  caring  for older  persons  varies  a great  deal  and
over  time. In the United  States,  less  than  10  percent  of the elderly  live  with  their  children,  and
very  few receive  any direct  income  support  from  their  children  (Kotlikoff  1992);  by contrast,  in
Japan,  still  a large  fraction  of the elderly  resides  with  their  children. The  importance  of other
groups  also varies  intemationally:  labor  unions  have  played  a central  role in organizing  and51
managing  worker  pension  plans  in most  of Westem  Europe,  for example.  Other  social  groups
at times provide  a source  of short  term funds,  as In the case  of rotating  savings  and credit
associations;  however  these  Institutions  probably  do not offer long term retirement  income
securiy (Besley  and others  1992).
19.  For  discussion  of  the Chilean  system  see  Baeza  (1986),  Baeza  and  Manubens  (19P8),  Bodie  and
Merton  (1992),  Cheyre  (1991),  Diamond  (1992),  Marcel  and Arenas  (1992),  Myers  (1985),  and
Wallich  (1983).
20.  These  Investment  restrictions  are being  liberalized  slowly  to permit  more  diversefication.
21.  For example,  Mesa-Lago  (1991)  found that several  Latin  American  nations' Social  Security
portfolio  performance  was  quite  poor  during  the 1980s.  Most  experienced  negative  real  rates  of
retum,  and in  the case  of the  single  exception,  Chile,  the govemment  was  forced  to bail  out  the
funds  In  the early  1980s  to forestall  bank  failure (Marcel  and Arenas  1992).  This  pattern  clearly
bodes  ill for the funding  status  of public  plans,  which  in principle  should  seek  to eam  retums
comparable  to those  of an intemationally  diversified  portfolio.  Bodie  and  Merton  (1992)  offer  an
Interesting  discussion  of how  to attain  this  target  while  limiting  capital  flight  for the  case  of Israel.
Not  only  have  public  pensions  performed  poorly  in the last  several  years;  private  pension  funds
have  recently  been  found  to eam  less  than comparable  private  mutual  funds,  a phenomenon
which  has  not yet been  fully  explained  (McCarthy  and Turner  1989).
22.  Adverse  selection  Is  discussed  by Bodie  (1990)  who notes  that it has  expensive  consequences
for privately  provided  pension  plan premiums.
23.  Mandating  pensions  can,  however,  have  undesirable  effects  of other  sorts  depending  on how
benefits  and  financing  are  structured  (Mitchell  1991a).  For  example,  a pension  plan  financed  by
a  payroll  tax makes  labor in the covered  sector  relatively  more  expensive, 'iich ultimately
depresses  employment.  Also,  an  unfunded  retirement  plan  may  reduce  national  savings.  Section
Ill evaluates  such  economic  effects  In more  detail.
24.  The  literature  on bequests  is extensive;  see  Hurd  (1990).
25.  Also there Is likely  to be a welfare  loss from mandatory  benefits  even when private  sector
providers  are  used  to deliver  them. Whether  the govemment  should  provide  the  benefit  itself,  or
require  that private  sector  entities  offer  it, depends  on one's  assessment  of how  efficiently  and
equitably  govemment  agencies  behave. This  would require  attention  to whether  there  are
substantial  scale  economies  (or diseconomies)  in centrally  managing  one pension  fund, how
bureaucrats  behave  when  awarded  control  over  huge  budgets  with  typically  litle administrative
oversight,  and how govemment  agencies  respond  to Interest  and pressure  groups. See  Barr
(1992)  and Mitchell  (1991a)  for a discussion  of these  and related  public  choice  problems  when
govemment  is the sole provider  of retirement  and other  benefits.
26.  Direct  evidence  on this  point  Is  thin,  and controversial.  For  example,  most  persons  In  the United
States  do not have  private  insurance  covering  old-age  nursing  home  care,  and many  say  they
believe  that  the  govemment  provides  such  coverage.  Whether  lack  of formal  insurance  coverage
Is sensible  or not depends  on how one assesses  the costs  and benefits  of private  insurance
coverage;  Pauly  (1990)  has  recently  argued  that observed  behavior  may  be optimal  Inasmuch
as it makes  extended  families  more likely  to care for their elderly  relatives.  In the case  of
pensions,  there  seems  to be  more  agreement  thait  workers  tend  to save  too little,  explaining  why52
patemalistic  employers  and governments  tend  to require  pensions.  Empirical  evidence  on the
latter  point  appears  In the next  section.
27.  See  McGreevey  (1990)  and  Grosh  (1990)  for a discussion  of Latin  American  plans;  among  others,
Atkins  (1991),  Diamond  (1992)  and  Takahashi  (1992)  discuss  Eastem  European  plan  difficulties.
28.  This  discussion  is taken  from Gustman  et al. (1992).
29.  These  responses  have  been  estimated  for males;  women's  retirement  responses  to economic
factors  may  be somewhat  smaller  (Pozzebon  and Mitchell  1989).
30.  These  conclusions  are supported  by a number  of microeconomic  retirement  studies  on the
United  States  and Canada,  capably  reviewed  by Quinn  and others  (1990). British  retirement
studies  by Zabalza  and others  (1980)  using  microdata  also tend  to confirm  these  conclusions.
English-language  joumals  offer  fewer  micro-data  studies  on retirement  pattems  in other  OECD
countries;  aggregate  time-series  studies  include  those  by  Zwelm0ller  (1991)  and others  cited  in
Section  I.
31.  Information  in this paragraph  derives  from  Gustman  and others.  (1992).
32.  On the  other  hand  positive  productivity  effects  of lower  mobility  due  to pensions  is difficult  to find
(Allen  and Clark  1987).
33.  In the United  States,  Mitchell  (1988)  found  that many  workers  did not  adequately  perceive  their
private  pension  plan benefit  rules,  and Bemheim  (1988)  reported  that public  social  security
retirement  offerings  were  also  widely  misunderstood.  Information  apparently  improved  as  workers
approached  retirement  age. The extent  to which  worker reallocate  labor  across  economic
sectors,  as well  as tabor  and leisure  over  their  lifetimes,  deserves  far more  study,  particularly  in
developing  countries.
34.  In his  literature  review  McGreevey  (1990)  refrains  from  drawing  any  conclusion  about  the size  of
the payroll  tax effect  on the demand  for labor.  Hamermesh  (1992)  discusses  and payroll  tax
incidence  in  the developing  country  context  and  concludes  that more  research  on this  topic  is
required  before  a consensus  can  be drawn.
35.  One  study  examined  whether  unemployment  compensation  beneffts  were  used  to smooth  the
path  to early  retirement  in the United  States,  and found  little  evidence  in support  of the thesis
(Hamermesh  1979).
36.  See  Munnell  (1986),  Munnell  and  Emsberger  (1989),  and Munnell  and  Yohn  (1990),  for a survey
of  theories  and  empirical  work  in  the  area.  The  most  well-known  proponent  of  the  view  that  social
security  reduces  savings  is Feldstein  (1976).
37.  There  Is  also  considerable  controvery  regarding  the  question  of whether  the  demographic  aging
of the population  will increase  or decrease  tie demand  for savings;  see  Auerbach  and Kotlikoff
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